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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular 
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is 
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the 
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to 
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their 
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent 
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at 
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics, 
case studies, research papers, articles, and books. Our aim is to make these 
case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the 
needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. 
Michael W. S. Ryan’s second case study for CIWAG is a deeply 
analytical and penetrating assessment of two challenges: first, how Jihadi 
Salaafist groups recruit individuals to their cause; and second, how we can 
stop them. Ryan’s argument is that to really disrupt the strategic 
communications of these groups, we must first understand how they 
leverage ideological frameworks to target vulnerable people. As a result, 
his nuanced analysis of the methods used by Jihadi Salaafist groups 
provides the framework for understanding how they hijack language and 
concepts to groom and retain followers. Ryan also addresses the question 
of how to inoculate against and repel these ideological overtures and help 
the families and communities they target by examining deradicalization 
and counter-radicalization programs in Saudi Arabia and Europe. For the 
United States, he recommends the establishment of a joint public-
private Corporation Against Ideological Violence, modeled after 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Ever the pragmatist, Ryan also 
discusses the barriers—both conceptual and institutional—that must be 
overcome to ensure such a program’s success.  
Classroom instructors should find the nuanced analysis of Jihadi 
Salaafist recruitment techniques a solid foundation for why and how these 
groups continue to appeal to diverse audiences despite battlefield setbacks. 
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Practitioners and academics should find the detailed discussion of how a 
public-private Corporation Against Ideological Violence could be 
organized, funded, and be effective a thought-provoking and pragmatic 
framework. 
It is important to note two critical caveats to this case study. First, 
the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do 
not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the 
Naval War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made 
to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately 
responsible for the content of this case study.  
We also have a special note of thanks for CIWAG’s senior editor, 
Janet Parkinson, for her tirelessly professional editorial work in bringing 
this complex case study from concept to full case study. Her good 
judgement and intellectual rigor were vital at all stages of development, 
from design to delivery.  
We hope you find this case study useful, and look forward to 
hearing your feedback and suggestions for how you can contribute to the 
Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the Naval 
War College. 
  






Michael W. S. Ryan is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and 
an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute, both in Washington, D.C. 
Formerly, he served as a senior executive in the U.S. departments of state 
and defense and as vice president of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation and the Middle East Institute. He studied Arabic in Egypt and 
received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. Dr. Ryan is author of 
Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America, 
published by Columbia University Press (2013). His current research 
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I. Introduction  
 
We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: 
in imagination, policy, capabilties, and management. – The 
9/11 Commission Report1  
 
 The vast majority of observers and analysts have argued that 
defeating the ISIS ideology (or that of al-Qaeda) is a job for soft power. 
The fact that all efforts to date have fallen short of the mark has not 
deterred the search for the magic key to make soft power finally work in 
this arena. The problem with such an approach is that ISIS treats its 
ideology and military doctrine as a part of a relatively seamless 
continuum. We need a new approach that attacks both in a coordinated 
fashion. This case study will illustrate how the United States can avoid 
repeating the four failures mentioned above in the war against jihadist 
ideology. 
 The struggle against ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates has always 
included two aspects. First is the close battle: kinetic operations conducted 
by military, intelligence, and police, assisted by the activity of globally 
networked financial institutions. The leaders in every aspect of the close 
battle are clearly identified and, with the lessons learned over the years, 
those leaders work to share information and coordinate their activities as 
much as possible in a coherent whole. The second aspect is the deep battle 
of ideas, engaged in collectively by the same actors and by other 
approaches such as diplomacy and international aid agencies.2  
                                                        
1 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States” (Official Government Edition 2004) 339; https://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/ 
2 Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy, (2013) 3-5. The terms “close battle” and “deep battle” are 
derived from briefings the author attended that General Michael V. Hayden (Ret.) delivered at 
Jamestown Foundation functions. Gen. Hayden emphasized that in the leadership positions he held 
at the NSA and CIA, the close battle, the battle of immediate life-or-death decisions, always 
demanded his time. The deep battle, on the other hand, while crucial to prevent jihadist groups 
from recovering from defeats in the close battle, was not a good fit in the time available to decision 
makers or in terms of the subject matter, an ideology based on a religion and non-Western cultural 
terms. 
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 The United States and its international coalition have prosecuted a 
mostly successful collaboration on the close battle despite occasional 
setbacks. This collaboration has not achieved all its goals and thus can 
declare significant progress but no final victory. We should expect this 
collaboration to continue even in the face of a reduced regional footprint 
by the United States. The deep battle—the war of ideas against jihadist 
ideology—has not achieved similar success, either at home or abroad. The 
elements needed for the war of ideas already exist, but they are much less 
developed and certainly less successful than kinetic operations. How can 
this be rectified? This case study will chart a new approach. 
 The United States fights the close battle both inside its own 
borders and internationally, country by country, in a networked coalition 
of allies and partners. Its fight in the deep battle must similarly engage 
within its own borders and simultaneously in collaboration with a network 
of allies and partners. The close battle is fought differently from country to 
country because of differences among national legal structures, military, 
intelligence, and enforcement capabilities. We should expect the battle of 
ideas also to be fought differently inside the United States from the 
methods used by our allies, although with large areas of overlap.  
 Each member of the American coalition has a unique mixture of 
history, culture, and government structure and thus must fight the battle of 
ideas using its own best judgment, first within its own country and then 
internationally as part of the coalition. Some countries are further along 
this path, and most face greater problems internally than the United States. 
Each international partner also needs to decide the relationship of its war 
of ideas to its internal enforcement and intelligence efforts.  
 So far, the war of ideas has had two aspects: (1) devising 
appropriate counternarratives to jihadist propaganda, and (2) thwarting 
jihadist recruitment, either by counter-radicalization efforts to prevent 
recruitment or by efforts to deradicalize those who have already been 
recruited. The results so far has been mixed, as we shall discuss in the 
course of this study. While developing a counternarrative to jihadist 
ideology is necessary to help prevent recruitment, we should not expect a 
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logical argument alone to be effective after full radicalization and 
recruitment. 
  A war of ideas against a religiously based ideology, like violent 
Jihadi Salafism, is difficult to define within U.S. Constitutional 
constraints. Some critics have asked why we should focus on a radical 
Muslim ideology when other violent ideologies have inspired fatal attacks 
in the United States for decades. Moreover, unlike the war of ideas during 
the Cold War, this new war is pitted against non-state actors who are 
expert at manipulating ancient cultural symbols that are foreign to the 
United States and the West in general.3 Unlike the Cold War, this new war 
is aided by technology that allows anyone with a cell phone to bring the 
war into our very homes. This war of ideas therefore must be fought from 
the highest federal level down to the most local of all levels, the cell phone 
of an individual adolescent.   
 This case study argues that defeating radicalization and promoting 
deradicalization needs to be addressed within a new federal agency in the 
form of a public-private corporation: the Corporation Against Ideological 
Violence, or CAIV.4 This would be a presidential initiative with bipartisan 
support, sufficient dedicated resources, and a clear focus on winning the 
war of ideas against radical ideologies that encourage or demand violence 
from their adherents. Although the primary motivation and focus of this 
study is creating CAIV to defeat violent jihadist ideology, the 
recommended methodology is applicable to any violent ideology and not 
specific to a particular religion or set of beliefs. In practice, it should be 
extended to cover other violent ideologies as well, whether based on 
jihadist, neo-Nazi or other ideologies.  
 This case study will examine what we have learned about the 
radicalization process as well as jihadist ideology and recruitment, first to 
define how a war of ideas might best be conceived and then to discuss 
                                                        
3 Since 9/11, the United States has fought Sunni jihadist groups, the latest of which is ISIS. The 
United States has hostile relations with Iran, which also promotes a violent ideology, but Iran is not 
included in Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) stemming from the 9/11 
attacks. 
4 The proposed initiative is modelled on another federal corporation, the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) in which the author served as a senior executive. Details on MCC are 
contained in Annex B. 
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how CAIV can help win the deep battle. It describes CAIV’s composition, 
methodology, costs, and initial tasks.  
 Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has worked hard to create 
the basis for collaboration and information sharing among elements of the 
close battle against terrorism at the federal level and between the federal 
level and the local level. This collaboration and information sharing must 
be formalized for the deep battle, both within the U.S. and internationally. 
Best practices, research, and tools thus must be shared among international 
and national partners in the collaboration in accordance with formal 
agreements.  
 General information, strategies, best practices, and international 
programs may be found in summary form on the Department of Homeland 
Security’s website under Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and in 
online reports from international institutions like the International Center 
for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, the United Arab 
Emirates’ Center of Excellence, Hedayah, and many others; but such 
information is scattered across the globe and is rarely in a usable format. 
Among the recommended tasks for CAIV is developing a new tool that 
captures such data in an accessible and usable form—an information 
fusion center, accessible to researchers, international partners, and 
ordinary individuals alike. CAIV would also develop a national hotline to 
provide individuals and families with online access to counsellors and 
would create professional training courses for counsellors at the state and 
local levels. CAIV would need grant authority and funding to assist local 
NGOs in developing the capacity to help communities counter violent 
radical ideologies before law enforcement becomes necessary. 
 
  This Case Study will develop its argument as follows. 
 First, it will describe the power of jihadist ideology in context. 
This part will examine the meaning of jihad for the Jihadi Salafist 
ideology. It will also identify the problem of dealing with nonviolent 
“gateway” groups, which teach an ideology that can lead to violence when 
an individual moves on to a Jihadi Salafist organization with the same 
goals as the gateway group but on a faster timeline. For example, it will 
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note the origins and development of Jihadi Salafism through the 
collaboration of the nominally nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood in exile 
and radical Wahhabi scholars in opposition to the Saudi Arabian 
government and the official Saudi religious establishment. It will describe 
the types of jihad before al-Qaeda and then how Jihadi Salafism developed 
further outside of Saudi Arabia by al-Qaeda to become what one jihadi 
strategist called the “global Islamic resistance.” Then it will examine the 
innovative fusion of jihadism and traditional Salafism in the person of the 
ISIS “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
 Second, it will examine the jihadist recruitment process and targets 
developed by al-Qaeda and vastly improved by ISIS. Research confirms 
the intuition that radicalization, whether within jihadism or neo-Nazism, is 
the product of the “intersection of an enabling environment and a personal 
trajectory.”5 This part will demonstrate how both ISIS and al-Qaeda aspire 
to provide the enabling environment by recruiting and securing individual 
and small-cell terrorists inside the United States without the benefit of the 
large footprint that characterizes its activities in Europe. It argues that with 
the loss of territory in Syria and Iraq, setting up cells in the United States 
has become a high priority for ISIS. This section also illustrates how ISIS 
translates into English or simply uses al-Qaeda’s English-language 
manuals on recruiting and securing lone-wolf mujahedeen inside the 
United States and elsewhere. It then describes the recruiting process and 
how it was applied in the case of one lonely American woman in a rural 
area. (Annex A has a more detailed analysis of the recruitment-to-
mobilization process.) 
 Third, it will make recommendations on how to win the war of 
ideas against ISIS, al-Qaeda, or any radical ideology. The basis of these 
recommendations is the establishment of a formal collaboration between 
elements of the close battle, including enforcement and intelligence, and 
elements of the deep battle or the war of ideas—both in a domestic U.S. 
                                                        
5 See Daniel Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for 
Countering Violent Extremism, (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 
2017) (Kindle edition) 76. Koehler is quoting from Fernando Reinares et al., Radicalisation 
Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism: A Concise Report Prepared by the European 
Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (May 15, 2008). 
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context and as a wider collaboration among allies and partners who share a 
violent ideological threat. This section will review first how this 
collaboration grew in the United States, in part out of the Obama 
administration’s presidential initiative on countering violent extremism 
(CVE). This collaboration has been among the major drivers of the close 
battle, including the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The section then explores how 
members of the international collaboration have conducted this, which 
varies from country to country. Part 3 focuses on the domestic U.S. 
collaboration on the deep battle and recommends establishing a new actor, 
the Corporation Against Ideological Violence, a wholly owned 
government corporation whose single focus would be on countering 
radicalization in the deep battle of ideas both domestically and 
internationally, while avoiding any duplication of effort with the highly 
successful close battle waged by American military, enforcement, and 
intelligence.  
 And fourth, the case study will describe CAIV’s makeup and tasks. 
CAIV’s domestic partners will include state governments and CAIV-
certified NGOs, as well as local communities. The purpose of domestic 
partners will be to offer an alternative to law enforcement for targeted 
interventions early in the process on the path to violence. CAIV also will 
create a virtual network for willing international partners comprised of 
centers formally established or supported by international allies and 
partners after the 9/11 attacks. (It is expected that some of these centers 
may also address ideologically inspired violence beyond the scope of 
violent jihadism.) For both domestic and international applications, CAIV 
will produce a two-phase approach that deals with current challenge and 
future threats. It begins with identifying and addressing the consequences 
of jihadi recruitment messaging and contents and also provides resiliency 
training to reconnect individuals with social networks that provide a 
bulwark against predatory recruitment. Additionally, it will introduce three 
major categories of doubt about the extremist path an individual may be 
contemplating: (1) doubts about the ideology itself, (2) doubts about the 
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leadership and group behavior, and (3) doubts about personal and practical 
issues. 
 The case study will conclude with a discussion of the creation and 
funding of CAIV, the authorizing legislation for its governance structure, 
and the special provisions afforded to it as a wholly government owned 
federal corporation in the form of a public-private partnership, and the 
decision to fund the effort for success through the Congressional 
appropriations process.  
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 Figure 1. Rocket Launcher and IED Lesson (credit:Wladimir van Wilgenburg)  
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 Figure 2. Greater Polytheism and Lesser Polythesim Lesson (credit: Wladimir 
 van Wilgenburg) 
 
Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a young journalist and scholar, 
has been embedded with the Kurdish fighters in Iraq and 
Syria since 2014. He traveled to several cities in northern 
Syria witnessing firsthand the war against ISIS, including 
the liberation of the ISIS capital of Raqqa. During June 
2016, he was embedded with Kurdish forces who were part 
of the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 
campaign to liberate the strategic town of Manbij. ISIS 
occupied and strongly defended the entire area. The SDF 
campaign’s purpose was to sever the ISIS group’s strategic 
smuggling corridor between Turkey and Syria.  
 Early that month, Wladimir visited an Armenian 
church in Tal Abyad near the Turkish border, which had 
been converted into a training center for fighters under ISIS 
occupation, but came under SDF control in July 2015. On 
the walls of one room was a series of white boards with 
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lessons in blue, black, and red Arabic script along with 
carefully drawn and annotated illustrations of various 
weapons and ammunition. The military training was highly 
technical and included the weight and size of rocket 
launchers and IEDs with every part carefully annotated. 
However, religious instruction was not far from even the 
most technical military training. Several boards held lecture 
notes on traditional Islamic topics like “the monotheism 
(tawhid) of the names and attributes of Allah,” “the major 
polytheism (al-shirk al-akbar)” that nullifies a person’s 
claim to be a Muslim, “the lesser polytheism,” and the most 
practical topic for governance, “the role of the shar‘iah.” 6 
  
With its superior Islamic credentials compared to other Muslim 
jihadist groups, ISIS has proven success in recruiting individuals and 
building a vibrant network of both provinces (wilayat) that hold territory 
and other guerrilla entities that do not yet hold territory.7 Despite its loss 
of territory in Syria and Iraq, the ISIS group’s powerful propaganda and 
military prowess as a terrorist group and as a proto-state make it 
potentially stronger than any other jihadist group, including present day al-
Qaeda. Moreover, the jihadist group’s ideology and organization integrate 
its religious and military aspects: as we have seen, ISIS displays its 
Islamic credentials even in classrooms devoted to military education and 
training. Although the United States and its allies have achieved hard-
fought military victories, ISIS will likely continue to use its powerful 
Islamic credentials to recruit and absorb new fighters to its cause, perhaps 
under a new name and with new leadership. After losing territory devoted 
to its proto-state, the group will no doubt wage guerrilla warfare and plot 
                                                        
6 Wladimir van Wilgenburg provided the author access to his copyrighted photos of the ISIS white 
boards in December 2017. The author translated the phrases from Arabic, and any mistakes in 
translation or description are his alone. 
7 For an account of how ISIS built a series of provinces and affiliates outside Syria and Iraq, see 
Bardia Rahmani and Andrea Tanco, “ISIS’s Growing Caliphate: Profiles of Affiliates,” 
(02/19/2016), www.wilsoncenter.org/articles/isiss-growing-profiles-affiliates 
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terrorist attacks, rather than the semi-conventional warfare that became its 
hallmark.  
The key point for our consideration of ISIS ideology is how 
Zarqawi (the leader of the ISIS group’s predecessor in Iraq) set the model 
not only for ISIS, but also for al-Qaeda despite its opposition to ISIS. 
Zarqawi did not separate ideology from military affairs. The ISIS group’s 
credentials in the person of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (renamed Caliph 
Ibrahim) are thus infused into its ideology, which is composed of 
traditional Salafi/Wahhabi religious teachings, modern extremist dogma, 
and an Islamized guerrilla strategy. 
Like al-Qaeda’s leaders, the wildly successful Zarqawi was not as 
powerful as he might have become if he had been recognized as a 
religious scholar. Unlike al-Qaeda, the organization he founded developed 
the ability after his death to argue that leadership and religious stature was 
established within one person, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The organization 
took the time to argue—publicly, in Arabic—that al-Baghdadi possessed 
all the qualifications of the original Arab caliphs, and when the time was 
right after the fall of Mosul, they declared al-Baghdadi to be Caliph 
Ibrahim. Al-Qaeda objected to this outcome, but too late; tens of 
thousands of jihadist fighters flocked to the new caliph’s banner.  
Even after the loss of its territory spread across the border between 
Syria and Iraq, ISIS still exists—primarily because thousands have 
accepted its integrated ideology. In the aftermath of American-led military 
successes against it, one renowned expert has argued that ISIS’s remaining 
strengths include “the power of its brand and its presumed ability to mount 
spectacular terrorist strikes in Europe.”8 It does not take much imagination 
to recognize that ISIS would desperately like to replicate that ability in the 
United States to regain a portion of its preeminence in jihadist circles 
while al-Qaeda “unobtrusively rebuilds its military strength” without 
triggering an overwhelming American response.9 
                                                        
8 Bruce Hoffman, “Al-Qaeda’s Resurrection,” Council of Foreign Relations Expert Brief (March 6, 
2018), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection 
9 Ibid. 3,7-8. Al-Qaeda has a current international presence of over 20,000 (not counting chaotic 
Syria and fellow travelers). Hoffman argues that al-Qaeda is presently trying to avoid suffering the 




A. The Meaning of Jihad for Jihadi Salafism  
 
 Both ISIS and al-Qaeda use variations of Jihadi Salafism as their 
ideology.10 As its name implies, the ideology is a fusion of the austere 
form of Islam called Salafism and jihad in the sense of religious warfare. 
In Arabic, jihad means “struggle” or “effort.” Jihad in this sense may be a 
spiritual struggle that has nothing to do with war. However, jihad in the 
public sphere in modern times almost always means a war to defend 
Muslims against attacks from non-Muslims and their apostate Muslim 
allies. Such a war may be purely defensive or preemptive. To understand 
jihad as a component of jihadist ideology, however, one must look at two 
aspects: first, jihad as insurrection against all Muslim leaders, who have 
now been declared apostate; and second, jihad as revolution against the 
New World Order, led by the United States and its close partner and ally 
in the Middle East, Israel. 
 Jihad as insurrection had its origin in the intellectual ferment of 
twentieth-century Egypt with two pillars of jihadist history, Sayyid Qutb 
and Abd al-Salam Faraj. 11  Because Sayyid Qutb declared universal 
takfir—that is, no Muslim countries exist, only individual Muslims—it 
followed that all nominal Muslim countries and their leaders were 
legitimate targets of violent jihad. In addition, Qutb argued that no 
legitimate caliphate had existed for hundreds of years, which by inference 
denied the Ottoman caliphate any legitimacy. After Qutb, Abd al-Salam 
Faraj wrote that violent jihad was an individual obligation. This point is 
crucial. In the ordinary order of events, political and recognized religious 
leaders called for jihad, and parents acquiesced in their sons’ participation 
unless their own country was under attack. Faraj’s statement means that 
individuals are obliged to wage jihad without official sanction or parental 
permission. 
 The precise origin of the term Jihadi Salafism is difficult to 
determine. However, as its name implies, Jihadi Salafism is the fusion of 
                                                                                                                                          
ISIS group’s fate at the hands of the American coalition but that this “ruse” will eventually end and 
it will return to terrorism in the West, presumably whenever such a course is feasible. 
10 In Arabic, word order is not always significant. The phrase “al-salafiyyah al-jihadiyyah” may be 
translated correctly either as Salafi Jihadism or Jihadi Salafism. I have chosen the latter in English 
because I view Salafism as the basis for personal morality, governance, and law and Jihadism as the 
violent and extreme variant of Salafism.  
11 See Michael W. S. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America 
(New York: Columbia University Press. 2013), 26-44. 
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the new universal concept of jihad born in Egypt and the austere form of 
Sunni jurisprudence born in Syria and Saudi Arabia. The Islamist ferment 
within Saudi Arabia’s religious opposition (1970–1996) became known in 
radical circles as the “Islamic Awakening.”12  Inside Saudi Arabia, this 
movement was composed of the political Islam of the Egyptian and Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood in exile, tailored to Saudi culture, and the radical 
teachings of fundamentalist Wahhabi scholars of the nineteenth century.  
 The ideology of Jihadi Salafism as we know it today emerged 
among what became known as the Shaykhs of Jihadi Salafism in Saudi 
Arabia between 1997 and 2003, the year the unsuccessful al-Qaeda 
insurrection began in Saudi Arabia. 13  Because neither Bin Laden nor 
Zawahiri had the formal knowledge or religious status to provide a 
theological justification for al-Qaeda’s and other global jihadists’ actions 
(unlike ISIS), they were forced to depend on outside theologians for the 
religious theory to justify them. Toward the end of the 1990s, a group of 
religious scholars inside Saudi Arabia, influenced by the Sahwa movement 
but more radical, began to provide such justifications for these global 
Jihadi Salafists.14 
 Jihadi Salafism as a violent revolutionary ideology was honed in 
the writings of the Palestinian-Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the 
actions of al-Qaeda’s leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
and the strategies of Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri. The 
emergence of ISIS represents the ideology’s end point, which may prove 
to be strategically premature after its conventional military defeat in Syria 
and Iraq. 
 Saudi Arabia suppressed the ideology of Jihadi Salafism inside 
Saudi Arabia and also defeated the al-Qaeda insurrection by 2005. The 
ideology is alive, however, wherever al-Qaeda or ISIS has a presence and 
inspires jihadists worldwide.  
 
                                                        
12 See Stephane LaCroix, trans. by George Holoch, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious 
Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2011) 
13 Saud al-Sarhan, “The Struggle for Authority: The Shaykhs of Jihadi-Salafism in Saudi Arabia, 
1997-2003,” in Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, eds., Saudi Arabia 
In Transition: Insights on Social, Political and Economic Religious Change, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
14 Saud al-Sarhan, “The Struggle for Authority: The Shaykhs of Jihadi Salafism in Saudi Arabia, 
1997-2003,” in Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, eds., Saudi Arabia 
In Transition: Insights on Social, Political and Economic Religious Change, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 181-206.  
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B. Types of Jihad: al-Qaeda’s Perspective  
 
 The prominent jihadi strategist and movement historian Abu 
Mus‘ab al-Suri separated jihadist warfare in the Middle East into three 
major types or “schools of jihad”—local clandestine organization, regional 
open-front, and individual or small-cell jihad.15  
 In classic local jihadism, radical jihadists form a clandestine, 
hierarchical group that mostly operated within a single country. The 
Fighting Vanguard group of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is a good 
example of this school. The Fighting Vanguard fought inside Syria, its 
only target, while the nominal Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership did 
very little leading from exile. Al-Suri opined that this kind of jihad failed 
in Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco as well as Syria because strong central 
regimes in the Middle East had developed powerful, modern security 
systems. These systems allowed the central governments to roll up a local 
clandestine group to the point that it was totally destroyed in its target 
country.  
 Al-Suri referred to the second school of jihad as “open front.” 
Open-front jihad is the form of jihadist insurgency that most resembles 
conventional warfare. It involves a wider, regional, overt approach that 
avoids the strict hierarchical cell approach and the limitations and 
vulnerabilities of a clandestine existence. Al-Suri’s examples of open-
front jihad include Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. This type of jihad 
was fought on a global basis and, according to al-Suri, was successful 
militarily and politically at least before 9/11. 
According to al-Suri, after 9/11 the U.S. and its allies in Europe 
partnered with the authoritarian governments of Middle Eastern countries 
to develop a global system to defeat jihadists wherever they were, starting 
with the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The 
primary factor in the defeat of open-front jihad, according to al-Suri, was 
the overwhelming technical superiority of American forces. The only type 
of jihadist warfare that would succeed in this environment, al-Suri argued, 
was what he called “the school of individual and small-cell jihad.” As its 
                                                        
15 See Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy, 207, 220 ff. 
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name implies, this last school involves what U.S. pundits refer to as “lone-
wolf “or “homegrown” terrorism.  
The complexity of al-Suri’s analysis is generally lost in popular 
accounts. For example, he argued that if the correlation of forces between 
the “Crusader-Zionist coalition” and the jihadist movement should 
approach a more equivalent status, he himself would join an open-front 
jihad. In other words, if the United States were to withdraw from any 
theater of jihadist open-front warfare, the balance of power between 
jihadists and its local enemies could shift in favor of the jihadist forces. 
Both al-Qaeda and later ISIS concluded that the best way to encourage the 
United States to withdraw its forces from the Middle East was to engage 
in classic guerrilla strategy from terrorism to semi-conventional warfare, 
not only in the greater Middle East but also in Asia and the Pacific, in 
addition to al-Suri’s strategy of small-cell and individual terrorism inside 
the United States and its allies’ borders. 
Al-Suri’s analysis stopped in 2005 when he was captured by 
Pakistani forces and handed over to the United States. The conditions he 
cited for jihadist success in the open-front model appeared in Syria during 
the Arab Spring, if only for a moment in historical time, but he was out of 
combat in Assad’s infamous Sednaya Prison. It is worth noting that al-
Qaeda in Syria (before the creation of the breakaway Organization for the 
Liberation of Sham [HTS] in January 2017) included traditional open-
front jihad, insurgents with conventional weapons, as well as its 
clandestine subset that the United States called the Khorasan group, which 
was charged with planning terrorist attacks against the United States and 
its allies outside of Syria. 
 
C. Jihad After ISIS: Fusion of Jihadism and Salafism  
 
Traditional Salafism, like other mainstream versions of Sunni 
Islam, views jihad as a community affair that involves the political 
authorities of a Muslim state. 16  Salafism is relatively forgiving of its 
                                                        
16 Thomas Hegghammer has used the term “classical jihad” to refer to the traditional jihad 
practiced by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and “global jihad” to refer to the concept of jihad as an 
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leaders as long as they are Muslims who have not committed major, 
nullifying sins in public. In accordance with this tendency, Salafist 
religious leaders generally support the concept of deference to wali al-
amr. Wali al-amr means “protector of affairs” and designates the authority 
that protects the Muslim community from internal and external threats and 
generally runs the affairs of state to that end, including the formal and 
binding declaration of jihad.  
Salafists and other Muslims consider jihad to be a collective duty 
(fard kifayah). However, Jihadi Salafists consider jihad to be an individual 
duty (fard al-‘ain). These distinctions are not mere esoteric details about 
belief structures—they have immediate practical effects on all Muslim-
majority countries concerning who has the right to declare war and who 
has the legal obligation to fight and materially support a religious war. 
Neither ISIS nor al-Qaeda accepts the concept of deference to the 
ruler in matters of war and peace. As Jihadi Salafist groups, they both 
follow Sayyid Qutb’s view that there are no Muslim countries, only 
Muslims, and therefore there are no legitimate Muslim rulers who must be 
obeyed. ISIS is the more radical because it does not recognize as Muslim 
any leader, including jihadists, who has not pledged allegiance to the ISIS 
caliph. Furthermore, only the ISIS caliph has the right to declare jihad as 
an individual obligation for all who would be Muslim.  
These basic elements of governing indicate the fusion of religious 
and political affairs in which there is no meaningful distinction between 
matters of religion and matters of war. This is important because it offers a 
further demonstration of why ISIS cannot be defeated by either hard 
power or soft power alone. Rather, it demands that the United States and 
its allies attempt to frame the war against ISIS as a fusion of soft and hard 
power, both conceptually and in practice.  
The same analysis could be applied to al-Qaeda, although that 
group has compartmentalized religion and ideology to some extent and is 
not currently in a position to declare a caliphate. Like ISIS, however, al-
                                                                                                                                          
individual obligation as championed by al-Qaeda. See Thomas Hegghammer, “Classical and 
Global Jihadism in Saudi Arabia,” in Bernard Haykel et al., Saudi Arabia in Transition (2016), 
207-228. 
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Qaeda has a Jihadi Salafist world view, which anticipates that it will 
achieve what ISIS has achieved, theoretically after securing a much 
greater consensus and therefore greater legitimacy and wider support. 
 
D. Hybrid-War Weapon  
  
 ISIS is trying to create a hybrid-war weapon out of the lone-wolf 
phenomenon. This is not a new form of jihad but a refinement, aided by 
modern social and other online media, of al-Qaeda’s doctrine on the use of 
lone wolves and small cells for political means, rather than as individual 
acts of revenge or rage.  
 To create the desired political effect, lone wolves and small cells 
must appear to be a significant threat while eluding the police. To that end, 
the ISIS group’s operations, explicitly based on Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s 
strategy, when applied to the United States is to create as many 
unconnected cells as possible that sustain themselves without any 
knowledge of the details of the existence of other cells. Thus no cell poses 
a security threat to any other cell; when police discover one cell, no other 
cell is threatened.  
 When the cells begin to operate, they (theoretically) will give the 
impression to the American people that the nation is under attack from 
within by a large, powerful group, something a vulnerable network could 
never achieve.  
 Jihadists are realists who have studied the United States for years. 
They have great respect for American police and intelligence agencies. 
They know that the likelihood that any cell will escape its first operation is 
miniscule. These clandestine units will not be extensively trained 
operatives, because such individuals would likely come to the attention of 
U.S. security forces and police. The al-Qaeda security manual, adopted by 
ISIS, is intended to give untrained clandestine cells a better chance of 
survival, at least until their first operation. A major recommendation is to 
look upon survival as a goal, something ISIS must realize is highly 
unlikely in the United States or even in Europe, where the group’s 
presence appears far more developed than in the United States. It would be 
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an additional benefit if the existence of the English-language manual gives 
U.S. authorities, other Americans, and overseas jihadists the impression 
that such cells already exist, even if they do not.  
The security manual’s theoretical exception to the no-suicide rule 
inside the United States would apply to the individual who had originally 
set up the small unconnected cells. Only that person would know about the 
details of the cells’ existence. In al-Suri’s theory, the original recruiter and 
set-up man, who he called the “builder unit,” should either leave the 
country before he is detected or perform a suicide operation so that his 
secrets die with him. With today’s technology, the “builder unit” would 
not need to be inside the United States to accomplish his goals.  
The last aspect of this hybrid-war weapon, which we should expect 
ISIS or its successor organization to use in the United States, is its “virtual 
planner” model. In this, the recruiter or a colleague becomes an online 
advisor and planner of an attack by a small cell with a high political value 
for jihadists.17  
 
E. Lessons from The 9/11 Commission Report 
 
The 9/11 Commission Report concludes: “We believe the 9/11 attacks 
revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and 
management.”18 Imagination is not the same as fantasy. Imagination in 
this sense is the projection of known jihadist aspirations, proven 
capabilities, and likely threat into likely future scenarios. Imagination 
requires creating the policies, capabilities, and management structure to 
avoid or defeat the next wave of jihadist attacks on the United States. 
Since the 9/11 Report, the United States has shown the imagination to 
create a formidable set of tools for the close battle, both at home and 
                                                        
17 See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman, “ISIL’s Virtual Planners: A Critical 
Terrorist Innovation,” War on the Rocks website (January 4, 2017). The authors suggest this model 
has been used in Europe and link its origins to the thinking of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri about 
simplifying attacks so that virtually any motivated cell or individual could carry one off without 
advanced training. 
18 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States.” 
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abroad. The United States now needs to show some imagination in the 
deep battle. 
While important in the bigger picture, the Jihadi Salafist ideology 
has had a limited impact on mobilization or recruitment to ISIS or other 
jihadist groups. By “mobilization,” I mean persuading existing jihadists 
and recent recruits to take a specific action, whether travelling to an area 
of hot jihad, committing terrorist attacks in situ, or simply waiting for 
future orders. I use “recruitment” to mean the process of inducing non-
jihadists to join a jihadist group. This process may involve persuading a 
non-Muslim to become a Muslim. (For ISIS, even nominal Muslims may 
be considered to be non-Muslims or apostates.)  
Individuals join a jihadist group for reasons other than ideology: to 
protect Muslims from attacks; to partake in the romance of jihad; to seek 
salvation through martyrdom; to seek revenge against the perceived 
perpetrators of violence against Muslims; and a variety of other reasons, 
some of which have nothing to do with religion, such as to earn money.19 
In the ISIS group’s case, the establishment of the Islamic State caliphate 
motivates foreign fighters and locals to join.  
Once an individual joins a jihadist group, however, ideology plays 
a crucial role in establishing group cohesion and identity. Ideology gives a 
well-constructed justification for violence in general as well as for extreme 
violence, which a recruit otherwise would find abhorrent. Ideology may 
also be the partial basis for mobilizing a recruit to action or travel at a 
specific time in the sense that ideology plays a role in a new recruit’s 
response to the call for action. In short, ideology rarely acts as the on-
ramp, but once recruited, an individual’s highway is defined by ideology. 
Jihadi Salafism also underpins the long-term goals of a group, 
including the establishment of an Islamic emirate or state and ultimately 
the caliphate. ISIS has fused the war-making implications of Jihadism and 
Salafism’s religious teachings into a single ideology personified by a 
paramount leader, the caliph—and has rendered meaningless the 
distinction between military dogma and religious belief.  
                                                        
19 For motivation to join ISIS, see Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside The Army of 
Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015) 
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To claim that ISIS has nothing to do with Islam is unsustainable 
and certainly will not work as part of a Western counternarrative. Muslim 
religious scholars have baulked at declaring ISIS to be outside Islam. 
However, other scholars as well as laypeople and journalists have 
compared ISIS to the Kharijites, the original partisans of takfir to 
demonize and then murder those who disagreed with their radical and 
uncompromising views of what it means to be righteous. Detractors, 
including other jihadists, have declared that ISIS is the source of unending 
fitna (internecine strife or civil war) among fellow Muslims, reminiscent 
of the periods following the death of the last Rashidun Caliph, Ali. Even 
before ISIS, Muslim religious scholars argued against al-Qaeda with a 
combination of historical and religious arguments from an international 
Muslim perspective.20  
Developing an effective counternarrative(s) to Jihadi Salafist 
ideology is problematic. In any case, defeating the Jihadi Salafist ideology 
requires much more than a counternarrative. The United States has 
developed increasingly effective and networked military, police, and 
financial programs against jihadist threats. These measures address those 
already radicalized and committed to Jihadi Salafism, which means 
committed to violence. While the difficult process of ideological 
“deradicalization” of individuals on a violent path is something that needs 
to be studied, it is not the main tool for defeating jihadist ideology.  
Defeating jihadist ideology means preventing the tempted from 
buying that plane ticket to the latest hot jihad. It means robbing jihadist 
recruiters of their ability to recruit by making the ideology unappealing to 
its targets. To defeat jihadist ideology in this last sense requires 
understanding how individuals become progressively radicalized to the 
point of violence. To defeat the recruiters, we need to understand their art 




                                                        
20 See Michael W. S. Ryan, “The Salafist Challenge to al-Qaeda’s Jihad,” Terrorism Monitor vol. 
8, issue 44 (December 2, 2010), The Jamestown Foundation (website). 
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III. The Radicalization Process and Targets 
 
Alex was a lonely young woman living with her 
grandparents in rural Washington state.21  After watching 
the horrifying video of ISIS beheading journalist James 
Foley in 2012, she went on Twitter to “understand why 
they were doing” such things. Alex quickly found herself 
talking to people who openly identified as members of ISIS 
and politely answered her questions. Soon she was talking 
constantly to her new friends, especially one who claimed 
to be an ISIS fighter stationed near Damascus. Her new 
friends led her to ask about Islam, and her days were filled 
with friendly conversations about Islam, Christianity, and 
her life. Now the lonely hours were filled with supportive 
male and female friends, who initially never asked anything 
of her. As she drifted toward radicalization, another ISIS 
member, Faisal, who lived near Manchester, England, took 
up her religious education. Under Faisal’s tutelage, Alex 
decided to convert to Islam. Afterwards she was 
communicating with “more than a dozen” ISIS 
sympathizers who sent her gifts, including a “$200 gift 
certificate to IslamicBookstore.com.” Faisal advised her not 
to go to a local mosque, “saying it was a government-
infiltrated mosque.” Her new “friends” led Alex further 
into extremism. Eventually, Faisal offered to send round-
trip tickets for Alex and her 11-year-old brother to travel to 
Austria to meet her future husband. Her grandmother 
intervened and confronted Faisal, and Alex promised to cut 
off all relations. But she missed her new friends . . .  
 
Radicalization usually begins with some form of recruitment 
process. To understand how to counter the ISIS group’s and al-Qaeda’s 
                                                        
21 For more detail, see Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American,” New York 
Times, June 27, 2015. 
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ideology, one needs to understand the processes of radicalization and its 
conjoined twin, recruitment.  
Recruitment often begins with a wide-area appeal, the shotgun 
approach, followed by an individualized appeal, the rifle approach. ISIS 
excels at both. The shotgun approach for ISIS includes professional video 
and audio productions on the dark web targeted at young Muslims, 
broadcasts of speeches in Arabic translated into European languages, 
videos of idealized life within ISIS territory, and what early Anarchists 
dubbed “propaganda of the deed,” which may include videos of battles, 
carefully orchestrated beheadings and other forms of mass murder, or 
more prosaic sermons by religious scholars. For some, the shotgun 
approach is enough to begin planning to join ISIS or al-Qaeda; for others, 
especially those most needed by either group, the personalized rifle 
approach is preferred or even necessary to seal the deal. It is also most 
likely the most secure approach because the very process of individual 
recruitment involves winnowing out unsuitable and suspect recruits.  
Here, we will refer to two English-language manuals that represent 
the ISIS group’s shotgun approach but also tell us a great deal about its 
rifle approach. The first manual is about the ISIS-recommended security 
regimes for jihadist cells based on al-Qaeda’s doctrine, and the other 
contains a step-by-step course on how to recruit individuals for al-Qaeda 
and similar Islamic societies at a time when ISIS was still part of al-Qaeda 
as the Islamic State in Iraq, further discussed in Annex A. Like the first 
manual, the recruiting course is based on jihadist strategist and historian, 
Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s magnum opus, The Call to Global Islamic 
Resistance (Da‘wah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah al-Alamiyyah).  
 
A. The Recruitment Process: The Shotgun Approach  
  
By the time al-Qaeda entered the world scene, jihadists had 
developed a sophisticated understanding of the types of recruits they 
needed and what kinds of appeals would motivate potential recruits. ISIS 
learned from al-Qaeda and improved on its broad recruitment approach by 
using social media and professionally produced videos. The most 
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successful broad approach for both organizations was to emphasize the 
injuries and humiliation wreaked on Muslims by the United States and its 
allies. For ISIS, another broad appeal was to join the ideal Muslim society, 
the caliphate.  
The intended audiences for these shotgun appeals included anyone 
who had suffered a racial or ethnic humiliation, real or imagined. Neither 
al-Qaeda nor ISIS tried to appeal to those who had formal religious 
training. They both preferred to provide religious training from the Jihadi 
Salafist perspective as a kind of finishing school for the 
radicalization/recruitment process.  
The al-Qaeda system did not aim for walk-in recruits. Instead, the 
organization generally insisted on a letter of recommendation from a 
known and trusted sympathizer before accepting a walk-in. ISIS was much 
more accepting of volunteer foreign fighters and developed a system to 
identify foreign agents or at least make it difficult for them to survive for 
long once they reached ISIS-held territory.  
Both groups could advertise their appeals through online jihadist 
forums to stimulate interest, which is still part of the shotgun approach. 
But at some point the group would need to deal with individuals—always 
a perilous step. Clandestine regional or country-specific jihadist groups 
learned painful lessons of the dangers of the individual recruitment effort. 
Without strict controls on recruitment enforced by the jihadists, security 
and police forces in the Greater Middle East quickly infiltrated their ranks. 
The United States, despite its well-publicized failures, has been very 
successful using sting operations based on careful police work.  
For some groups in the Middle East like the various Muslim 
Brotherhood organizations that work on a long-term time horizon for 
jihadist goals, recruitment is often a family affair or starts with young 
adolescents before they are of an age formally to join a Muslim 
Brotherhood branch or other gateway organization. For such groups, being 
a member is a cradle-to-grave proposition. Leaving the group would mean 
leaving one’s family. Betraying a group means betraying one’s family. 
Both are very difficult propositions, but not impossible if an individual has 
become impatient for action.  
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However, these groups cannot always fill their ranks through the 
family structure and must then venture outside. Reaching out to strangers 
introduces the need for strictly enforced security measures to protect the 
recruiters, as well as counterintelligence procedures to guard the group 
against infiltration. Because Muslim Brotherhood–style groups in the 
West have a history of hiding their true identities, forgoing formal ties to 
Muslim Brotherhood branches in the Middle East, and remaining 
nonviolent, they generally fall outside enforcement’s purview. The one 
striking exception is a case in which such a group provided funding to a 
designated foreign terrorist group.22 One author referred to this seemingly 
tactical nonviolence of otherwise radical groups in the U.S. as “the 
counterterrorism conundrum.”23  
Al-Qaeda and ISIS have ambitious goals, no matter where they are. 
Both demand large numbers of recruits, and both must constantly replace 
attrition, create new affiliate organizations, and create individual or small-
cell terrorist organizations behind enemy lines in Western countries. While 
ISIS recruiting is much more advanced from a technical and social media 
standpoint than al-Qaeda’s traditional approach, both rely on the same 
basic principles for targeting individuals, albeit with some differences in 
procedures. Many of al-Qaeda’s and the ISIS group’s principles and 
procedures for security for individuals, small cells, and larger groups are 
explained in the works and lectures of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri.24  
In the United States one does not need to read Arabic to learn 
about al-Suri’s recommendations for lone-wolf or small-cell 
counterintelligence. ISIS adapted his teachings in an English-language 
manual for clandestine counterintelligence under the title “Safety and 
Security for Lone Wolf Mujahideen and Small Cells,” which it uploaded 
                                                        
22 For example, Texas-based Holy Land Foundation’s trial in 2007 saw all defendants found guilty 
of providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (Hamas). The 
prosecution presented evidence of the intention of establishing a hostile “Islamic Movement led by 
the Muslim Brotherhood.” (Government Exhibit 003-0085/3:04-CR-240-G, U.S. v. HLF, et al.) 
23 See Lorenzo Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 166-198. 
24 For an analysis of al-Suri’s ideas, see Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy (2013), 193-254. 
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in October 2015.25 The translator for ISIS informs his readers that, with 
some modifications and updates, his course is taken from al-Qaeda’s 
Course on Security and Intelligence, which was originally intended for 
traditional jihadist groups. The ISIS manual also advises its readers to read 
al-Qaeda’s English-language Inspire magazine for information about 
building bombs and other tricks of the trade, the same magazine that 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev read to produce the weapons used in the Boston 
Marathon attack.26 
The security manual’s technical content will not surprise anyone 
familiar with standard government or private-sector security precautions. 
For example, it stresses the supreme importance of maintaining vigilance 
against host-country security services, practicing general information 
security, varying everyday routines, and performing careful advance 
planning. The manual offers advice on setting up a safe house, devising a 
cover story, and safeguarding and transporting weapons, among other 
things. If the reader intends to recruit members to his or her small cell, the 
author advises using family members or lifelong acquaintances.  
Its context is entirely different, however, from similar documents 
in the West. The manual begins with quotations from the Qur’an and 
examples from hadith and biographical literature of the Prophet. The 
analysis accompanying the selections is intended to persuade potential 
terrorists that preserving their safety is a religious duty. It gives radicalized 
individuals permission to suppress their Muslim identities if that would 
contribute to the success of the mission.  
The point of terrorism inside the United States or one of its allies is 
to produce a political effect that helps the jihadist cause. For the 
mujahideen inside the United States, the purpose is to make the United 
                                                        
25 See Michael W. S. Ryan, “Hot Issue: How DAESH’s Lone Wolf Guidance Increases the Group’s 
Threat to the United States,” The Jamestown Foundation (website), (November 24, 2015), 
https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-how-daeshs-lone-wolf-guidance-increases-the-groups-
threat-to-the-united-states/ 
26 The Wall Street Journal’s Alan Cullison had access to Tamerlan’s computer (on WSJ 
assignment) after the Boston Marathon bombings (04/15/2013). Cullison told the author of this case 
study that Tamerlan was a “voracious reader” of right-wing extremists as well as jihadists. Personal 
conversation, May 2013. 
Ryan Defeating ISIS and al-Qaeda on the Ideological Battlefield 
30 
 
States “pay the price” for actions against jihadists overseas and to goad 
Americans to take harsh actions that may radicalize other Muslims. 
Both al-Qaeda and ISIS have promoted suicide attacks as a cost-
effective weapon to use in battle or in places they cannot reach otherwise; 
they will continue to follow this path. 27  Suicide, however, is not the 
preferred tactic inside the United States in the long run. Nevertheless, the 
manual stresses that the jihadist operating in the United States, with its 
effective intelligence and police agencies, should not expect to be able to 
escape to a safe haven somewhere outside the country.  
 
B. The Recruiting Process: The Rifle Approach   
 
“A lot of brothers—and (at one time) I fell into this 
group—consider the idea of Da‘wa [recruitment] to be that 
candidates who merely listen to a jihadi cassette or 
motivating lecture, etc. will suddenly stand up and shout 
out or say with motivation, ‘we want to be a troop and go to 
fight against America!,’ without considering the gradual 
stages which the candidate must pass through…”28 
 
 What the author is about to describe above is the painstaking way 
the recruiter must approach individual recruitment to be effective. Such an 
approach is usually time-consuming, as demonstrated by Alex’s journey, 
mentioned earlier. After ISIS pioneered the use of social media, jihadist 
recruitment of individuals became more cost-effective and secure, but it 
could still consume a great deal of time. Potentially, any man or woman 
with a cell phone and the latest encryption software and secure apps could 
                                                        
27 The manual begins with a clear approval of a suicide operation outside the U.S.: “I would like to 
congratulate the Ummah of Islam on the heroic operation carried out by our brother, the martyr 
Abu Dujana al-Khurasani…” The Jordanian suicide bomber’s given name was Hamam bin Khalil 
Abu Mallal al-Balawi. Abu Dujana was the Jordanian suicide bomber who killed and wounded CIA 
officers, contractors, and others inside Camp Chapman near Khost, Afghanistan on December 30, 
2009. 
28 A Course in the Art of Recruiting: A graded, practical program for recruiting via individual 
da‘wa. The document’s pages are not numbered. The quote is from the first page of the preface. 
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become a powerful recruiting center, if they know and practice the correct 
method, which the course aims to provide.  
 The rifle approach to recruitment involves a slow start and 
accelerates to a very pointed call to join a jihadist group. Calling the 
recruit to join is not theoretical or some time in the distant future. The 
recruiter is prepared to provide travel funds and is directly tied into a 
logistical system through the traditional entry points for jihadists to the 
Middle East, Turkey, and to some extent Pakistan. Sometimes, however, 
the recruiter may advise the recruit to operate in place. 
 From media reports, we know that this recruitment approach works 
on individuals who may never have thought about becoming a Muslim, let 
alone becoming a terrorist in the ranks of jihad. A talented and 
experienced recruiter, especially with ISIS, will choose the right candidate 
and exploit their needs in a methodical way to exert a powerful yet subtle 
influence over the course of his or her (often) young life.  
 If the recruiter chooses to influence a young American to pursue 
jihad at home, the process may be very near to impossible to reverse. No 
generic counternarrative will be likely to affect such a situation. There are 
very few examples of reversing a radicalization process outside of a 
controlled situation in a prison in which jihadists may be persuaded to 
renounce violence. Even in successful cases, the reversal involves only the 
realization that violence may not achieve the jihadists’ goals. The adopted 
principles and learned goals are likely to remain.  
 To defeat jihadist ideology therefore, the best approach is to 
intervene as early as possible—before the recruitment process is finished 
and before an individual advances beyond stage one on the path to 
violence.29 For some individuals, however, even then it may be too late. 
 
C. The Art of Recruitment  
  
 For ISIS, as for al-Qaeda, the preferred method of recruitment is 
ultimately personal. Shotgun-approach videos may allure those who feel 
the need to redress Muslim humiliation when they cannot address their 
                                                        
29 For a discussion of the stages, see “The Behavioral Approach,” below. 
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own feelings of humiliation in a normal setting. The wide approach may 
also engage young men in the romance of combat on the path of “Allah,” 
or even the attraction of living in the ideal Muslim society; some young 
women have expressed the need to marry and raise children in the 
caliphate under shari‘ah law.  
 Most people, however, need a final push from the personal touch 
to make the decision to opt for violence in place or travel to participate in 
the great romance of jihad. That final push comes from some sympathetic 
person who is a guide with all the answers to the potential recruit’s 
questions.  
 The personal touch, the rifle approach, also is probably necessary 
to find a way to motivate the vital administrative professional, which ISIS 
and al-Qaeda organizations always need and can rarely obtain. Very few 
of these potential recruits will be motivated by the Jihadi Salafist ideology, 
which becomes a crucial factor once the potential jihadist becomes actual.  
 So how does the personal approach turn radical ideas or extremist 
dreams into action—into violence? 
 The second manual was an al-Qaeda production, which has also been 
used by ISIS,30 that helps answer these questions because of its content. 
Using the shotgun approach, al-Qaeda authors produced and provided a 
manual for potential recruiters with the title A Course in the Art of 
Recruiting: A graded, practical program for recruiting via individual 
da‘wa.31 The dedications in the manual included the Islamic State in Iraq, 
which was then technically part of the al-Qaeda global network.  
Da‘wa in the manual’s title is the Arabic word for “call” or 
“invitation” to Islam. For ISIS and al-Qaeda, Islam means Jihadi Salafism. 
Every other form of Islam is a deviation for Jihadi Salafists, although al-
Qaeda postpones judgment in most cases, whereas ISIS is quick to use the 
                                                        
30 For an apparent example of how ISIS uses this manual, see Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS and the 
Lonely Young American,” The New York Times (June 27, 2015). 
31 Thanks to Claire Weinraub, who brought the recruiting manual to my attention. The security 
manual is available online by subscription at MEMRI and the SITE Intelligence Group, among 
others. It originally appeared in a jihadist Twitter account before being taken down. Although the 
document shows no author, the cover page indicates that it was collected and organized by Abu 
Amru Al Qa’idy [sic]. The last page shows that it was translated by Abu Mujahid [sic] and Abu 
Khalid [sic].  
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label of “apostate” for any group or leader that disagrees with the ISIS 
group’s claims to the caliphate.  
The manual presents a course in recruiting mujahideen, or individual 
and small-cell terrorists as well as foreign fighters, and also tells us a great 
deal about the radicalization process and its targets. The principles are the 
same for ISIS and al-Qaeda, but they have slightly different targets.  
Al-Qaeda has a well-known set of targets, which its leaders and 
essayists have explained over the years. Al-Qaeda traditionally does not 
prefer to recruit individuals with traditional formal religious training, 
because that would involve confronting what is likely a more mainstream 
version of Islam. Jihadists would rather recruit someone without formal 
religious training. Neither al-Qaeda nor ISIS wants to be forced to counter 
what they consider an incorrect understanding of Islam. For this reason, 
they may discourage a potential recruit from going to a local mosque. If 
the target recruit is not a Muslim, the recruiter may offer to instruct him or 
her and convert them online.  
The recruiting manual does not use Jihadi Salafism as a major initial 
part of the call to jihad. Since potential recruits probably have little deep 
knowledge of Islam, let alone Jihadi Salafism, the ideology cannot be an 
entrance point. Potential recruits often do have a Muslim identity, which 
will be the starting point once a recruiter has identified a promising 
candidate. 
 While the appeal of jihadism may play a role in recruitment, 
recruiters are urged to show great patience in their dealings with potential 
recruits. Jihadism can be used to show the recruit that he can perceive 
himself to be a winner if only he would take the step into righteous 
violence. He or she can travel to a hot jihad and make a difference in 
redressing the humiliation of fellow Muslims, or stay in place in a Western 
country to fight behind the lines. If the recruit has led a dissolute life, jihad 
can cleanse him of his sins. If he feels he does not belong in an infidel 
land, he can join the caliphate and perhaps participate in the Apocalypse to 
usher in the ultimate triumph of Islam.  
Of course there are many other more mundane appeals, which the 
recruiter will find over time. For example, the person may simply need 
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money for his family, which is more likely a motivation in the Middle 
East. Or perhaps he or she is an opportunist living in an area where either 
ISIS or al-Qaeda operates, and seeks a status or some benefits out of the 
situation. Obviously, with the ISIS loss of territory in Syria and Iraq, the 
recruiting job for foreign fighters becomes more difficult and would only 
apply locally to affiliates unless ISIS or some other entity arises again in 
historically Muslim lands.  
On the one hand, recruiting lone-wolf or small-cell jihadists may 
actually be marginally easier in one respect after the loss of ISIS territory 
and the possible defeat of al-Qaeda and other jihadists in Syria. It would 
not be difficult to argue that the United States is responsible for the loss of 
the territory in Syria and Iraq claimed by the ISIS neo-caliphate. On the 
other hand, reestablishing recruiter networks and a coordinated, coherent 
message will take time for the core neo-caliphate without a clear safe 
haven.  
However, ISIS and its predecessors have shown great patience and 
determination, while the U.S. has on occasion been too quick to declare 
victory and lose focus on this peculiar threat. It takes little imagination to 
recognize that the United States has done little to adopt policies, 
capabilities, and the effective management structure to thwart jihadist 
recruitment and ideological developments in the years following the ISIS 
caliphate’s military loss in Syria and Iraq, al-Qaeda’s resurrection, and the 
emergence of new jihadist groups.  
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IV. What Is To Be Done? Go Broad, and Go Deep 
 
Before we begin our search for counter-ideology tools, we must 
acknowledge that jihadists, especially ISIS, have perfected the tools they 
use. As expert as the United States is in the intelligence, enforcement, and 
military spaces, we have yet to find our way in the counter-radicalization 
space. With our tradition of freedom of speech and religion, we have 
found the task of countering jihadism especially challenging because a 
legitimate religion, however distorted, is the basis of its radicalizing 
ideology. Americans have tried to ignore the religious context and power 
of jihadism, and we have occasionally demonized Islam itself, rather than 
identifying and attacking its aberration. Neither approach is valid, and 
neither has been effective. We need a reset. 
Just as jihadists have used the shotgun approach and the rifle 
approach in spreading their ideology, the United States and its partners 
need to address both a broader audience as well as individuals when 
opposing that ideology.  
Just as jihadists do not recognize borders, we need to transcend 
borders in our programs to counter their ideology. In practical terms, that 
means the United States and its partners need to combat jihadist ideology 
locally, within each country, and also internationally, as a network. Such 
an approach is not different from how the United States and its partners 
have fought the close battle against al-Qaeda using intelligence, 
enforcement, international financial tools, and the military both 
internationally and, with the exception of the military, inside the United 
States in a relatively seamless effort.  
Just as we have worked to prevent or limit access to safe havens to 
jihadists in the close battle, we need to limit jihadist recruiters and 
ideologues’ access to physical and virtual safe havens.  
The close battle has had false starts (Iraq, and the failure to 
capture/kill Bin Laden early in Afghanistan), but we have improved our 
collective game eventually (draining al-Qaeda of funds, disrupting their 
central command and control, and taking away territory from ISIS in Syria 
and Iraq). We improved the tools of fighting the close battle (drones, 
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intelligence, financial networks, and cooperation), and so should we 
expect to improve our approach and tools for the deep battle to defeat 
jihadist ideology and recruiting—if we make the effort a priority. First, we 
need to review what has been done, often under the rubric of countering 
violent extremism. 
 
A. Countering Violent Extremism  
 
After the ISIS group’s dramatic loss of territory and a series of 
horrific terrorist attacks by both traditional clandestine cells and surprising 
individual attacks, European countries have reason to be concerned about 
citizens returning from the killing fields in Iraq and Syria. Even if the 
return is less than expected or the returnees are less interested in pursuing 
violence, European countries still have reason to remain concerned. They 
need to consider how best to absorb these citizens and how to deal with 
the problem of home-based terrorists. In addition, law enforcement and 
political processes are faced with the rise of xenophobic right-wing groups 
and political parties.  
This amorphous but powerful set of worries was reflected in the 
2014 United Nations Security Council resolution 2178, which recognized 
the need for programs to deal with returning citizens from fighting in Syria 
and Iraq. President Obama responded to the issue by convening a three-
day summit on countering violent extremism (CVE).32 The problem with 
the summit appeared to be the vagueness of the terms of engagement and a 
flaw in the concept itself: Who are these violent extremists? If the United 
States perceives them only as Muslims, Constitutional and therefore 
crippling legal issues are inevitable. 
The fact sheet for the Obama summit cites approaches “to counter 
hateful extremist ideologies that radicalize, recruit, or incite to violence.” 
Although al-Qaeda and ISIS groups are referenced, the proposals could 
                                                        
32 See “FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism” (February 18, 
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-
summit-countering-violent-extremism 
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theoretically include any kind of extremist ideology on the left or right of 
the political spectrum.  
In the United States, CVE was intended more for communities, 
with assistance from the federal government in facilitating local 
partnerships and strengthening law enforcement. Recruitment of foreign 
fighters is noted as a target problem. There is vague language covering all 
the domestic and foreign bases, but CVE as a political movement has not 
caught fire in the United States as it has in Europe and some Middle 
Eastern countries such as Morocco and Iraq. Not many U.S. entities 
beyond terrorism experts and university centers have focused on CVE as a 
priority.33  
Some U.S. Muslim communities joined the voices that were 
concerned that CVE programs, despite their anodyne language, seemed to 
be a thinly veiled cover for surveillance and police enforcement programs 
against Muslim Americans. Other Americans criticized CVE as not being 
forthright that the problem is “radical Islam”; still others ridiculed it as 
ineffective, asserting it assumes dubious profile markers that allow experts 
to identify those who will turn violent or fall for an ISIS operative’s pitch.  
Meanwhile, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence have become 
more effective in general and more alert to the potential problem of 
radicalized individuals. The FBI website indicates that investigations are 
underway in all 50 states about “Homegrown Violent Extremists 
(HVEs).” 34  The website leaves no doubt that HVEs are identified as 
“global-jihad-inspired individuals who are based in the U.S., have been 
radicalized primarily in the U.S., and are not directly collaborating with a 
foreign terrorist organization.”35 The problem for the FBI is that knowing 
an individual has become radicalized is not evidence that this same person 
                                                        
33 For example, the Center for Cyber & Homeland Security at George Washington University 
created a “Program on Extremism.” See Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, “Countering Violent 
Extremism in America (June 2015), 
https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CVE%20in%20America%20.pdf 
34 See the official FBI website: https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism 
35 Ibid. 
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will become violent. Having radical thoughts and speech is not a crime in 
the United States.36  
 
i. The Behavioral Approach  
 
 Peter Bergen has described an approach that the FBI takes, not just 
for terrorism cases but for other violent crimes as well.37 This approach 
was developed within the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) in the 
division devoted to terrorism after 9/11. While the details are complex, the 
concept is to focus on the behavioral process (as demonstrated by 
research) that someone goes through from grievance to violence. This 
approach does not depend on a perpetrator’s perceived motivation, state of 
mind, or a specific radical ideology. However, as noted previously, 
violence occurs at the intersection of an “enabling environment and a 
personal trajectory,” whether that environment is a toxic ideology or a 
criminal gang.38 The behavioral scientists in the FBI did not consider this 
truism in their approach to the issue. 
 The BAU, in consultation with private-sector security experts, 
developed a methodology to identify who will become violent, based on 
how far they travel on a six-step pathway-to-violence framework. Factored 
into this analysis are the existence of what may be perceived as inhibitors 
to violence: a stable family, a satisfying job, etc. In plain words the 
pathway may be described as: (1) a grievance, (2) the decision to act on it, 
(3) research and planning, (4) active preparation (obtaining and testing 
weapons), (5) dry run/surveillance of the target, and (6) violence. The 
advantages of using this approach include the ability of analysts to observe 
these steps, in part because of the phenomenon of leakage, which is the 
                                                        
36 Another issue with the definition, if one takes the term literally, is that HVE should capture other 
domestic violent extremists in addition to “global-jihad-inspired.” This is not a problem of FBI 
understanding the issue of home-grown terrorism, but the definition as stated in this context is 
misleading.  
37 See Peter Bergen, United States of Jihad: Who Are America’s Homegrown Terrorists and How 
Do We Stop Them? (New York: Broadway Books, 2017), 233-243. 
38 I drew this insight from Fernando Reinares et al., Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of 
Terrorism: A Concise Report Prepared by the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent 
Radicalisation (May 15, 2008), p. 9. 
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ordinary by-product of the radicalization process. Individuals usually like 
to talk about their new ideas and convictions and what they intend to do 
about them. For our purposes, it is important to note here that step one in 
the BAU process may be something as universal as boredom or loneliness, 
and the enabling environment could be any number of ideologies. 
 Generally, families and the radicalizing individual’s social milieu 
(friends, teachers, etc.) notice the changes that individual is undergoing. 
The families may be part of the problem, or they may not know what they 
are seeing or how to address it. Reluctant to see their family member or 
friend arrested and perhaps prosecuted, family and friends may also be 
reluctant to contact the police, especially in stage one or even stage two in 
the BAU model. Although they may not trust the police for a variety of 
reasons, they may however be willing to seek help from government 
agencies or NGOs without a law enforcement mission that are ready to 
help without threatening the family’s integrity.  
 For social service agencies or an NGO, using the BAU approach or 
something similar might avoid two problems. First, they may be able to 
avoid prosecution for the individual being radicalized if they can intervene 
early enough. Second, the behavioral model cannot be reasonably charged 
with a bias against a specific religion, as it does not depend on, for 
example, targeting the sudden adoption of the most conservative Muslim 
practices in dress or worship. If an individual’s actions show that he or she 
is on a path to violence, every situational indicator would inform the 
formulation of an effective intervention based on the specific ideology 
(enabling environment), whether jihadism, neo-Nazism, some other form 
of extreme racism, or simple criminality.  
 There will still be cases that avoid detection. Bergen points out that 
the Boston Marathon bombers displayed all the steps outlined in the BAU 
approach and, furthermore, that all “inhibitors” that might have prevented 
the Tsarnaev brothers from becoming bombers had “fallen like 
dominoes.”39 For example, the brothers’ immediate family had left the 
United States, and Tamerlan’s dream of improving his situation by 
participating in the Olympics as an elite amateur boxer had been crushed. 
                                                        
39 Ibid., 240. 
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The Tsarnaev brothers’ path to violence was noticed by relatives and 
others. Russian authorities had warned the FBI that Tamerlan had shown 
himself to be radicalized while on a trip to Dagestan. FBI agents 
interviewed him, but agents saw no evidence that Tamerlan was planning 
an attack.  
 It is often noted that Tamerlan researched how to build the bombs 
and remote detonators he and his brother used by reading the English-
language version of al-Qaeda’s Inspire. Less reported is another 
phenomenon reflective of a recommendation in the last stage of al-
Qaeda’s A Course in the Art of Recruiting. Tamerlan’s reading exposed 
him to translated selections of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s writings on 
individual and small-cell terrorism behind enemy lines.40  
 Tamerlan was far along his ultimate path, but that path was not 
straight. Alan Cullison, a journalist for the Wall Street Journal, was given 
access to Tamerlan’s computer after the police had finished with it. 
According to Cullison, Tamerlan, often portrayed as an unintelligent thug, 
was a voracious reader, and in addition to jihadist material, he had 
researched violent right-wing militia writings. 41 He is not understood to 
this day. Most likely, he was deep into his radicalized world and far along 
the path to violence by the time the FBI interviewed him, but still able to 
put up a false face. 
This is a cautionary tale. All we can do is reduce risk in hardcore 
cases and strive to improve our understanding of the Tamerlans of the 
world—if not of their psychology and motives, at least of their telltale 
actions. Defeating future Tamerlans before their cascading psychologies 
tip into violence—when coupled with what we are already doing in the 
close battle—is the equivalent of victory over jihadist ideology and 
perhaps other as yet unnamed violent ideologies. This victory is worth a 
significant investment.  
 
                                                        
40 For more on al-Suri and the Boston Marathon bombers, see Michael W. S. Ryan, “The Boston 
Marathon Bombing: Radicalization Process and the Tsarnaev Brothers,” The Jamestown 
Foundation website (May 9, 2013), https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-boston-marathon-
bombing-radicalization-process-and-the-tsarnaev-brothers/  
41 Alan Cullison, personal conversation, May 2013. 
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ii. Radicalization and Deradicalization  
 
 Daniel Koehler, the director of the German Institute on 
Radicalization and Deradicalization Studies (GIRDS), has written 
Understanding Deradicalization, the definitive sourcebook on 
radicalization and deradicalization from extremist ideologies, which takes 
into account the latest programs and research.42 Koehler, who turned to 
studying the threat of jihadism after extensive experience studying the 
neo-Nazi movement, tries to bridge the gap between theoretical research 
and the practical needs of those who struggle against violence inspired by 
violent ideologies.  
 The book is a comprehensive guide to deradicalization theories, 
programs, and methods as they are today, and also a “who’s who” in 
modern research on the radicalization and deradicalization processes. 
Koehler recognized that government authorities cannot wait for theory and 
research before they take practical steps to thwart violent radicalization. 
While a major purpose of his book is to help practitioners devise programs 
to counter violent extremism, it starts from the premise that one must first 
understand the radicalization process based on well-documented empirical 
evidence.43  
 Like the author of the jihadist recruiting manual, Koehler’s view is 
that radicalization proceeds by limiting a target’s choices of political 
concepts and values to a specific ideology, which ultimately leads to 
violence as the only valid choice. He refers to this process as “de-
pluralization.” The logical counter to this process is to persuade the 
radicalized individual or group that there are more choices available. 
Unfortunately, we live in a world of Jihadi Salafist recruiters, who, as we 
have seen, choose their targets carefully and follow a very painstaking 
path to lead them to radicalization and violence. 
                                                        
42 Daniel Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering 
Violent Extremism (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2017) (Kindle 
edition). Koehler is the Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and Deradicalization 
Studies and a Fellow at George Washington University’s Program on Extremism. 
43 Ibid., 5, 45, 65,74-78, 81-83, 89, 227, 294. 
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 The power of these recruiters is vastly enhanced by the new world 
of social media, which, as never before, allows us to “de-pluralize” our 
news sources and acquaintances to those who share our concerns and 
ideology. The recruiter, using either the shotgun or the rifle approach, has 
tailored the radicalization process to take account of social media and the 
target’s weaknesses; because of this, radicalization becomes like a very 
addictive drug that changes the addict’s brain chemistry to the point that 
giving up the drug seems worse than death. The bitter irony is that the 
perceived solution to all life’s problems is a single huge problem.  
 The experience of those who have tried to deradicalize individuals 
or groups has not been encouraging. The recruiter following A Course in 
the Art of Recruiting is counselled at every step except the last one to 
abandon a target recruit if they fail periodic assessments. This is true no 
matter how many months the recruiter has spent on daily and weekly 
interactions.  
 Unlike the jihadist recruiter, a government official choosing to 
abandon a radicalized jihadist would mean failure. The experience of 
those who have tried to deradicalize groups in a prison setting in the 
greater Middle East has generally not resulted in any of the groups (or 
individuals) giving up their Jihadi Salafist ideology. The most that has 
been achieved is what appears to be a tactical retreat from violence and 
sometimes a separation from the radical group. Recidivism is always a 
problem.  
 The challenge of counter-radicalization is to identify and intervene 
with individuals early on the path to violence and encourage them to reject 
it because of compelling doubts raised about the validity of the violent 
ideology, practical doubts about the path an individual is contemplating; 
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B. Programs Outside the United States 
 
i. The Saudi Experience  
 To get a sense for the prospect for deradicalization programs 
applied to Jihadi Salafists in the Middle East, it helps to examine the best 
of them, Saudi Arabia’s.44  
 Saudi Arabia began its program in the shadow of the al-Qaeda–
staged insurrection inside the kingdom. The Saudi program for radicalized 
Saudi nationals began in 2004, and another facility was established in 
2007 for intensive counselling before prisoners were finally released into 
society, a halfway house between prison and freedom. Prisoners, some of 
whom had joined al-Qaeda, including some who had passed through 
Guantanamo, were tested and screened for candidacy in the 
deradicalization program. From the beginning, the program was well-
funded and well-resourced and was adjusted over time to take advantage 
of lessons learned. The Saudis who designed the program were often 
Western-educated and included psychologists and security experts to 
assess the candidates.  
 The prison program exposed candidates to critiques of their 
jihadist ideology by world-class Muslim scholars. These scholars provided 
arguments against the jihadist ideology including the use of takfir and the 
proper role of the Shari‘ah. The most openly hardcore radicals simply 
dismissed the scholars, however, and were rejected by Saudi officials.  
 Over time, the Saudis recognized, like most researchers 
worldwide, that the aim of deradicalization should be adjusted to convince 
participants to renounce violence, rather than the probably unachievable 
goal of renouncing their ideology altogether. The Saudis also realized that 
                                                        
44 See Marisa L. Porges, “The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment,” Council on Foreign Relations 
Expert Brief (January 22, 2010), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/saudi-deradicalization-
experiment; see also Andreas Casptack, “Deradicalization Programs in Saudi Arabia: A Case 
Study,” Middle East Institute (June 10, 2015), http://www.mei.edu/content/deradicalization-
programs-saudi-arabia-case-study. For an example of one former al-Qaeda member who was 
released from a Saudi rehabilitation program only to join 10 other al-Qaeda members in an escape 
to Yemen and there help found AQAP in Yemen, see Michael W. S. Ryan, “The Reemergence of 
AQAP Operative Mish‘al Muhammad al-Shadawkhi,” Militant Leadership Monitor, 3 no. 7 (July 
31, 2012), https://jamestown.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/Militant_Leadership_Monitor_-
_Volume_III__Issue_7.pdf?x87069.  
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a radicalized version of Islamic history is a component of the original 
radicalization process, and so they worked to correct the candidates’ faulty 
understanding of history. As incentives to reform, Saudi Arabia offered 
candidates for release cash incentives, jobs, and even marriage, along with 
a new family to reintegrate them into Saudi society. After their release, the 
graduates are monitored to look for signs of any form of returning to an 
active participation in or contact with radical organizations or elements. 
The Saudi government has proven that it has been consistently 
serious about its deradicalization program. Their program is state-of-the-
art and a valuable tool to increase our knowledge of the radicalization 
process for confirmed Jihadi Salafists. Nevertheless, establishing success 
in the deradicalization process remains elusive.  
Recidivism rates are difficult to verify. The Saudis have increased 
their original rosy estimates to an estimated 10%-20% recidivism rate. 
Even the lower number still constitutes a significant security threat. In 
addition, at least some, perhaps 11, individuals fled to Yemen and likely 
participated in the establishment of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). We know that Said al-Shihri completed the Saudi program, but 
fled to become the deputy leader of AQAP in Yemen, and in that capacity 
oversaw the bombing of the American embassy in Sana‘a in 2008. 
Further, we must consider the openly hardcore jihadists, who washed out 
after the initial assessment, to be constructive failures.  
On the flip side, we do not know with certainty whether the Saudi 
program should take credit for all those who did not return to violence. 
How many of those were not truly committed to their radical choices in 
the first place? Some individuals are repulsed by the violence once they 
have seen its effects, and some simply grow out of a radical orientation. 
Of course, some may return to violence in the future under the right 
circumstances. 
 It would be hard to replicate the Saudi experience in its totality 
elsewhere. Few countries have the financial resources to devote to the 
issue, and no other country, even in the Middle East, shares Saudi 
Arabia’s political culture, which the royal family is uniquely able to 
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manipulate without hard-power solutions. 45  Any number of Middle 
Eastern countries, or any country attempting to deradicalize individuals or 
groups, can and should bring mainstream Muslim scholars to prisons or 
elsewhere to counsel jihadists on the error of their beliefs and actions. 
However, we cannot expect such interventions alone to be successful 
enough in the short term to rely on as a solution. Koehler’s findings agree 
with the Saudis’ eventual conclusion that deradicalizing as a matter of 
practicality and realism—within a prison—needs to aim at changing 
actions rather than relying on a program’s ability simply to persuade 
committed jihadists to abandon jihadist ideology. Furthermore, there will 
be some hardcore jihadists who are beyond anyone’s ability to convince to 
reject violence.46 
 
ii. Major European Approaches  
 
More than 40 countries have adopted some form of a program to 
counter jihadist extremism through deradicalization programs and 
rehabilitation programs within prisons.47 Currently, this responsibility in 
the United States is spread among a number of entities that have a 
counterterrorism focus, including Homeland Security, the National 
Counterterrorism Center, the FBI, the Department of State, the 
Department of the Treasury, and others. Other Western countries have 
adopted other models and vary in where they place the responsibility for 
counter-radicalization.  
The Danish model, SSP (schools, social services, police), was 
originally designed to deal with youth gangs; religious radicalization was 
                                                        
45 Although Saudi enforcement agencies do not hesitate to use harsh measures, Saudi Arabia’s 
social and political culture is partly based on history and is partly a product of the ruling royal 
family’s construction. In a system Stephane Lacroix refers to as “sectorization,” the royal family is 
the only institution in the country that “maintains vertical relations with all the sectors making up 
the field of power, and horizontal relations between sectors are practically nonexistent.” For details, 
see Stephane LaCroix, trans. by George Holoch, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious 
Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2011), 22-29.  
46 For an early look at prison programs, see Andrew Silke, “Disengagement or Deradicalization: A 
Look at Prison Programs for Jailed Terrorists,” CTC Sentinel, 4 no. 1 (January 2011). 
47 Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization, (2017) 290 (Kindle edition, Loc. 7456). 
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added after 9/11. This program has its home within the Danish police.48 
The police set up mixed teams called “info houses” to exchange 
information on potentially radicalizing individuals. These info houses 
internally share information between the police and social services and 
then perform outreach to schools and/or parents or others to determine 
what kind of program might help the identified individual. Parents and 
teachers can also initiate the action by coming to the info houses with their 
worries. Because of the Danish culture and traditions and its relatively 
small population, this model is reportedly very effective. Although these 
conditions for success are not available to most countries, the concept of 
info centers where police and social services can collaborate is worthy of 
consideration.  
Germany has approximately one-fourth the population of the 
United States, but the number of foreign fighters supplied to jihadist wars 
in the Middle East is estimated to be 800 individuals compared to the 
estimated 129 foreign fighters the United States produced. The German 
model is thus built to deal with a large problem—not only with the issue 
of continued radicalization within its borders, but also with returning 
fighters (estimated in 2016 as 270, compared to 9 for the U.S. by 2017). 
Beginning in 2012, the German counter-radicalization approach has been 
based on a public/private partnership funded within the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugee Affairs (BAMF) in the Ministry of the Interior.49 
The Interior Ministry is responsible for state security, including federal 
police and a Joint Anti-Terrorism Center, which provides information and 
analysis for all federal police in its area of responsibility. BAMF provides 
a hotline, which can be anonymous, as a first line of counseling for 
families and others concerned about a radicalizing family member or 
student. Once engaged in a specific case, the BAMF refers it to one of four 
NGOs that provide counseling for such cases. Individuals may also 
contact the NGOs directly if they prefer. While successful, this flexible 
approach creates problems in achieving and maintaining equal standards 
                                                        
48 Koehler, Ibid. 149-151 (Kindle edition, Loc. 3904-3927). 
49 Koehler, Ibid. 151-152 (Loc. 3927-3957, Kindle edition). BAMF is the German acronym for 
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. 
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of counseling. Germany has a one-week training course available for 
counselors, but NGOs tend to follow their own policies and approaches. 
Every case, therefore, requires a great deal of transparency and 
communication between different federal partners on every decision 
concerning treatment. The German model has influenced other countries, 
including Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada. 
The Dutch decided to build a counter-radicalization center from 
scratch. 50  After a number of pilots, the government established two 
organizations that work together: one for family support for 
deradicalization and another “exit unit” for individuals. Unlike other 
models, they were not built within existing enforcement units as add-ons 
but were designed specifically for these tasks. Both units work in close 
cooperation with existing civil society organizations devoted to the same 
or similar work. All their counselors went through extensive training 
before opening in November 2015. Because of the way the Dutch 
government proceeded, its approach was likely more expensive than the 
models that build on existing organizations. One positive aspect of this 
approach was that the government planned a unit dedicated to the issue of 
deradicalization, intervention, and family counseling built to government 
requirements.  
Traditionally, the French model was based on hard law-
enforcement efforts without any soft-power attempts at family counseling 
or support.51 Then in April 2014, the French government published a new 
counterterrorism strategy that announced the creation of several softer 
programs. These included specialized deradicalization facilities in prisons 
and the introduction of a family support hotline. In 2015, the French 
government also launched an online counternarrative campaign and in 
2016 opened deradicalization wings in two prisons, staffed with trained 
counsellors and psychologists to work on prisoners’ rehabilitation. These 
new, softer programs were built within the government’s counterterrorism 
infrastructure and were designed to provide intelligence to law-
enforcement agencies. In addition, the French planned 12 voluntary 
                                                        
50 Koehler, Ibid. 152-153 (Loc. 3957-3973, Kindle edition). 
51 Koehler, Ibid. 153-153 (Loc. 3973-3957, Kindle edition). 
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deradicalization centers outside the normal prison setting. The centers 
received serious criticism from a bipartisan report to the French Senate 
issued five months after the scheduled opening, however—at that time, 
only one had opened, and it was sitting empty. After just a year, the center 
closed.52 In addition to criticism of their disastrous start, poor planning, 
and underfunding, one critic asserted that the voluntary centers were not 
intended for deradicalizing jihadists but instead were focused on 
prevention. 
Many other international programs exist beyond the space 
constraints of this case study, and descriptions of them are available online 
at various levels of detail.53 The examples cited here describe established 
approaches of major European countries that would likely be among the 
members in any U.S.-proposed effort at dealing with violent radical 
ideologies. 
 
C. The United States Today 
 
 In the United States under the Obama administration, the 
government’s efforts at confronting radical ideology, termed “countering 
violent extremism” (CVE) was a shared responsibility both domestically 
and internationally. The Department of State pursued various efforts at 
creating an effective international communications strategy, but it has 
been largely underfunded within the traditionally strained State 
Department operating budget and plagued with false starts. 
 Under the Trump administration, domestic and international efforts 
under the banner of CVE appear to have a doubtful future. However, some 
activities captured under this banner may continue in some form. For 
example, in 2017, the Department of Homeland Security approved “26 
                                                        
52 See James McAuley, “France’s Deradicalization Centers Seen as a ‘Total Fiasco’,” Washington 
Post (2/24/2017), https: //www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/frances-deradicalization-centers-
are-a-total-fiasco-lawmakers-say/2017/02/24/218a8072-fa97-11e6-aa1e-
5f735ee31334_story.html?utm_term=.b06f98ff4680 
53 For example, see the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Report, Countering 
Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good 
Practices from the OSCE Region (September 28, 2017), 
https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/346841 
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grants—totaling $10 million for two years of programming—to 
organizations that will work to improve the security of our communities 
and prevent terrorism.” 54  These grants were approved for local law 
enforcement agencies, state and local government agencies, universities, 
and nonprofit organizations. As one would expect, the grants are weighted 
toward those aimed at helping first responders confront the results of 
radicalization and prevent violence.  
 Other federal government enforcement and intelligence agencies 
were given a role in the Obama administration’s CVE initiative, which 
includes public outreach and information programs that will likely 
continue, regardless of the nomenclature used to describe them. For 
example, the FBI’s public information programs, such as its “Don’t Be a 
Puppet” website or something similar, will probably continue, although 
some groups have criticized it, among other things, for “perpetrating 
stereotypes.” 55  Further, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has broad 
authority to coordinate the U.S. Government’s domestic and international 
counterterrorism intelligence programs. NCTC will likely continue its 
coordinated outreach programs to domestic governments and communities 
in a variety of ways, regardless of whether the CVE label is continued. All 
of these entities use information and outreach missions as a means of 
enabling their main missions of enforcement and intelligence. 
 Currently, with the encouragement and support of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, individual states and territories have 
established “fusion centers” to coordinate activities mostly related to 
counterterrorism. Because the centers are generally owned and managed 
by large police departments, their purpose is to encourage intelligence and 
information collection and sharing with other enforcement entities. 
However, some of these centers, especially in larger states, provide 
workshops and other programs that reach out to local communities and 
organizations. Since they are focused on enforcement, they do little or 
                                                        
54 See https://dhs.gov/cvegrants. 
55 See https://cve.fbi.gov/home.html. While apparently well-intentioned, like all of CVE, this 
website has met with criticism. See, for instance: http://karamah.org/press/dont-target-our-children-
fbis-dont-be-a-puppet-website-in-schools-must-be-dropped 
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nothing about the threat of jihadist ideology except in the most general 
sense. 
 These U.S. enforcement programs should be continued. They are 
crucial to supporting first responders and other entities on the front lines 
who fight ideologically based violence with interventions or arrests. When 
the radicalization/recruitment process morphs into support for or 
commission of violence, however, the intelligence and enforcement 
communities must always prioritize uncovering useful information and 
intervening to prevent violence against individuals or communities.  
 The immediate threat of terrorism will always be the priority issue 
for the close battle—and thus the deep battle of ideas will of necessity 
always be a secondary priority in competing for resources and the precious 
time of decision makers. Defeating violent extremist ideologies in the 
deep battle may benefit from lessons learned through enforcement and 
intelligence operations, but the war of ideas demands different actions, 
requires different skill sets, and operates on a different, often longer, time 
horizon. In addition, many affected communities and families may feel 
more comfortable going to an entity that is not dedicated to enforcement, 
but instead is chartered to help people understand the potential threat of 
violence in their lives and communities and avoid the need for 
enforcement. 
  Koehler and many other experts recognize that some individuals 
decide on their own to reject jihadist ideology, but no one has a generally 
accepted explanation for why this happens or how to replicate it. 
Researchers know more about how individuals and groups become 
radicalized than they know about how to reverse the course. This 
conclusion is not intended to discourage research into deradicalization—
such research has many benefits, including learning more about how 
individuals become radicalized.  
 On the other hand, if the United States sets a priority of defeating 
Jihadist ideology as a way of breaking the cycle of continuous 
conventional warfare against jihadist groups and preventing what “home-
grown” terrorists, trying to convert jihadists by debating ideology in 
person is neither cost-effective nor politically feasible. Research 
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demonstrates that there are more promising approaches, such as family 
counseling, as in the German model.56  
 As mentioned above, to be successful a deradicalization effort or 
an early intervention should proceed by introducing three sets of doubts 
about the path an individual is contemplating: doubts about the ideology; 
doubts about the leadership and group behavior; and doubts about personal 
and practical issues.57 Such a program also must be designed to hand off a 
subject to enforcement agencies when an individual’s case analysis reveals 
someone too far along the path to violence for a noncoercive program. The 
tools needed for a national counter-radicalization—i.e., a counter–violent 




                                                        
56 See Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization, (2017) 291 (Loc. 7456, Kindle edition) 
57 See Ibid. 148 (Loc. 3866, Kindle edition) 
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V. The Solution: The Corporation Against Ideological 
Violence 
 
 The sorely needed deep battle of ideas must address the 
recruitment of individuals to violent ideologies and terrorism across a 
broad spectrum, including Jihadism and neo-Nazism. The purpose of such 
a program in the United States must be to thwart the radicalization process 
by offering individuals, communities, and schools multiple alternatives to 
their questions and concerns, involving both outreach and a one-stop 
location for information about the radicalization process.  
 To address this, I propose the creation of a new federal entity—the 
Corporation Against Ideological Violence (CAIV). CAIV would be a 
collaborative public-private partnership within the federal system. While it 
would collaborate with other entities tasked with the counterterrorism 
mission, it would have the lead in counter radicalization and 
deradicalization.efforts. The tools of the collaboration would include 
research, education, information, communications, and cyber, with 
enforcement as a backup. Because of the nature of this public counter 
radicalization effort, CAIV would not include classified information or 
sensitive law-enforcement information.  
 CAIV would need to be a presidential initiative with bipartisan 
support. This would give the United States and potentially its allies new 
tools and approaches, as well as creating a new collaborative international 
effort to thwart the efforts of extremist ideologues to radicalize individuals 
and groups. As a federal program, CAIV would serve as an example for 
potential use or adaptation, both domestically and internationally. Its 
shared data and shared research could create a learning environment in 
which all participating countries could collaborate. It would engage the 
deep battle first against Jihadism, and then against other violent 
ideologies.  
 It is important to note that CAIV would not compete with the 
counterterrorism community. Rather, it will augment their efforts, acting 
as a resource to the enforcement and intelligence communities while 
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benefitting from information gained by those communities about the 
radicalization life cycle in the United States and other affected countries. 
 
A. The Way Forward: First, Approach the Problem 
 
Because thwarting radicalization must be a collaborative effort 
involving the participation of both private and government centers, a 
number of elements are needed to ensure successful collaboration. These 
include shared pain, a convener of stature, a clearly defined purpose, a 
common information base, a sense of movement, a formal charter, 
committed leaders of stature, and representatives of substance.58  
 The first two prerequisites of successful collaboration in business 
and government are the existence of a shared or common pain and a 
convener of stature. The existence of HVEs in all 50 states is a clear 
indicator of a shared pain, calling for collaboration on a national scale. 
The federal government is the convener of stature and will ensure a 
nationally consistent approach. CAIV will foster the collaboration among 
the governmental and private institutions required for success in the 
domestic context. The U.S. government also has shown its ability to lead 
international coalitions, another part of CAIV’s mission. 
 
B. The Way Forward: Establish the Tools 
 
 Two additional elements of collaboration are a clearly defined 
purpose and a common information base. CAIV’s clearly defined purpose 
is to defeat violent ideologies in the United States; its common 
information base is the information fusion center.  
  CAIV’s information fusion center would collect and disseminate 
best practices and research about how to counter radicalization by 
attacking its root ideology via the shotgun approach. CAIV would enable 
                                                        
58 The principles of collaboration are an adaptation of those found in Mike Leavitt and Rich 
McKeown, Finding Allies, Building Alliances: 8 Elements That Bring—and Keep – People 
Together (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2013). The author had the privilege to work for and with the 
authors as a senior executive at the EPA. The importance of the elements of collaboration was a 
significant theme.  
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the collaboration of private-sector researchers, media, and IT experts, as 
well as liaison officers on loan from government agencies such as 
Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice (FBI) with missions in the “close 
battle.” The purpose of the liaison officers would be to provide useful 
public information from their parent departments and agencies and to 
facilitate collaboration and de-confliction between the close battle and the 
deep battle. The Department of State would be the natural conduit to 
overseas partners.  
As well as information produced by American experts, the fusion 
center would include information translated from partner countries’ 
experts, such as Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, or Emirati scholars giving 
explanations of terms like takfir from a variety of mainstream Muslim 
perspectives and legal refutations of ISIS positions on violence, suicide 
attacks, and other topical issues. The idea is not to create talking heads but 
to have easily accessible and authoritative counters to extremist 
propaganda and jihadist recruiters’ ploys. This would not be a passive 
collection function but would be driven by the latest information and 
research about topics with high payoff.  
The bulk of CAIV’s responsibility, however, would involve the 
rifle approach to help families, communities, and prisons intervene against 
the radicalization of individuals and work to disengage potential offenders 
at least from violence, if not from the extremist ideology itself. The first 
step is to provide clear, authoritative answers to questions such as, How do 
I know my child is under the influence of a recruiter? in an attractive, 
accessible format online. CAIV would provide information to families, 
communities, schools, and the U.S. Congress that would raise everyone’s 
awareness of threats of online social media. CAIV could provide 
releasable profiles of observable behavioral changes during the 
radicalization process described as the “path to violence,” as well as the 
process and methods used by recruiters to induce those changes. Such 
programs require a national hotline with trained counsellors ready to 
respond to calls for help. In addition to the national hotline and 
counseling, CAIV would also provide information on specially designed 
prison programs aimed at preventing recidivism for violent offenders. 
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Other features would include links to established international programs 
like Hedayah.ae, the English-language website supported by Dubai, and 
similar international and American websites devoted to countering Jihadi 
Salafist propaganda. 59  The Defense Department would be helpful in 
community outreach in the United States because of its unique ability to 
provide compelling evidence of the tragic results of jihadist groups’ 
recruitment in the real world rather than the mythical world of propaganda 
and recruiting. 
 The tasks assigned to CAIV will no doubt change over time based 
on internal and external evaluations of what works. Initially, we must plan 
for a comprehensive center for countering violent radicalization primarily 
based on violent ideologies, whether they be based on race, politics, or 
religion. At the heart of CAIV will always be the information fusion 
center, a clearing house for information about radicalization and 
deradicalization based on open sources made accessible to the public in a 
state-of-the-art, interactive website and drawn from curated sources in the 
United States and from a network of international partners. 
  Internal performance measurements would fulfill the fifth element 
of successful collaboration, a sense of movement toward clearly defined, 
measurable goals. CAIV will need to define performance goals for each of 
its tasks and design evaluations to create a constant learning and 
improvement environment. To achieve truly meaningful performance 
goals, staff will need to evaluate operations and continually correct goals 
and performance measures. Initially, these measures would include 
“output” (number of interventions) and “intermediate” measures (time and 
cost of fusion center module rollouts); as CAIV becomes established, 
these would be supplanted by, for example, the number of successful 
interventions compared to the number of tips, and the relationship of NGO 
activities to verifiable statistics concerning national trends in violent 
ideological recruitment. It is vital that CAIV’s performance-reporting to 
Congress and the public can always cite independently verified empirical 
data to support its claims and that cost-effectiveness is prioritized in 
funding.  
                                                        
59http://www.hedayah.ae  




C. The Way Forward: Establish Governance 
 
 CAIV would need a formal charter establishing its placement in 
the federal system, the composition of its Board of Governors, and 
covering interactions with foreign and domestic partners. In its authorizing 
legislation, Congress should emphasize that CAIV is not a regulatory 
institution and that its oversight functions are restricted to certifying 
institutions and requiring independent audits and performance reporting. 
Legislation should also require the Board of Directors to provide oversight 
in order to avoid mission creep and duplication of effort. The best model 
would be the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which was 
established as a corporation within the federal government but has 
characteristics of both a federal agency and a private corporation.60 The 
MCC model for CAIV will allow for easier international collaboration and 
a clear source of funding through interagency transfer or stand-alone 
appropriations.  
 To succeed, CAIV will need to be a clear administration priority 
and have the bilateral support of congressional leadership. To keep costs 
down, to ensure a nimble response to changing trends, and to avoid a “go-
it-alone” culture, the permanent staff should to be capped by the by-laws 
in a range of 300-350 at full strength.61 To attract clients within the United 
States, CAIV should be formally separate from law enforcement, 
intelligence, or military hosts. To ensure collaboration, however, the 
Defense Department, Homeland Security, the State Department, the 
Department of Justice, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
would need to be involved through seconded liaisons and membership on 
                                                        
60 Congress authorized MCC in PL 108-199 on January 23, 2004. MCC receives its appropriation 
as part of the appropriations subcommittees that fund the State Department and foreign operations 
in the House and Senate. Similarly, CAIV would need its own authorizing legislation but would 
need to be funded by the appropriations subcommittees for either Homeland Security or the 
Department of Justice. 
61 The size and governance of CAIV is based on the author’s experience as a VP in the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC), which in 2018 reported a staff of 352 but is committed to reduce it 
to 320 in 2019. Since 2004, MCC has signed 33 compacts with 29 countries and is responsible for 
programs in 47 countries. (See Annex B.) 
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the Board of Governors. To avoid interagency conflict and promote 
collaboration where appropriate, CAIV (similar to the MCC structure) 
would report to a high-level Board of Directors drawn from Cabinet-level 
directors and prestigious private-sector leaders appointed by the President 
of the United States.  
 The CAIV initiative will require collaboration at various levels and 
within different spheres. Inside the U.S., CAIV would require 
collaboration with state governments and institutions, schools, 
universities, and affected communities, as well as federal government 
agencies. Overseas, CAIV would need to collaborate with the appropriate 
governments and potentially with existing institutions or centers with a 
similar mission. 
 Collaboration requires representatives of substance, subject-matter 
experts, whether on research issues, enforcement issues, or 
counterterrorism issues. Successful collaboration also requires committed 
leaders. Without committed leaders of stature for the Board and CAIV 
itself, the program will fail to secure collaboration at a high enough level 
with necessary partners, and it will founder. Stature in this instance for the 
Board of Directors means an individual with a well-known public profile, 
such as a Cabinet secretary or the head of a significant government 
agency. The ideal Chairman of the Board would be the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, with the Attorney General as Vice Chairman. Other 
voting members could include the Department of State, the Department of 
Education, the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center. As with the 
MCC, the National Security Advisor would have a seat as an observer, and 






                                                        
62 During this author’s 18-month tenure at MCC as a VP (2006–2008), he briefed the Board on 
financial and budget issues for the CEO and observed a very high level of attendance (including the 
Secretary of State herself) for MCC Board meetings, which were scheduled to accommodate the 
extremely demanding schedules of the Board. 
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D. CAIV’s Organization and Tasks 
 
Initially, CAIV would act as a clearing house for information about 
the radicalization process in the United States and elsewhere, along with 
best practices learned in collaboration with our partners and allies, both 
internationally and in collaboration with a variety of American 
institutions, such as state and local governments, NGOs, and research 
centers associated with universities. In addition, it would operate an 
anonymous hotline as well as counselling services for communities and 
families confronted with the radicalization of individuals. Such a hotline 
service would provide anonymous or engaged counseling, as well as 
interactive web interfaces offering information about the radicalization 
process, the known recruiting practices of ISIS and al-Qaeda, and life 
stories of those forced to live under the rule of the ISIS caliphate.63 
Taking a cue from the indications-and-warnings culture of military 
intelligence and the threat-management culture of law enforcement, CAIV 
would create a series of indicators that an individual is on or approaching 
the path to violence and develop a warning protocol to establish how far 
on that path that individual may be, based on empirical evidence gleaned 
from leakage. These indicators would be available to all partners, both 
nationally and internationally. 
Rather than competing with existing functions, CAIV thus would 
alleviate some of the pressure on law enforcement to act on to every tip 
that someone might become violent or is enmeshed in the web of an 
ideologically violent recruitment effort. CAIV ultimately would take on 
the task of intervention with the family or social environment of the target 
individual through partners at the local level and then recommend a direct 
intervention with the individual with trained counsellors or refer the case 
to law enforcement when an individual has already committed a crime or 
                                                        
63 During the rise of ISIS, al-Qaeda quietly became more powerful as a network in the Greater 
Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and is arguably a stronger threat to the United 
States and its allies in the long term. This threat will manifest itself especially if the United States 
grows weary of fighting any nodes in the al-Qaeda network except those that pose a direct, 
immediate threat to American vital interests. 
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is far along the path to violence.64 It would be expected that many of these 
tips would come directly to the CAIV hotline, especially before the NGO 
network is fully established.  
Its workforce should be a combination of civil service employees, 
administratively determined employees, and liaison officers on loan from 
the military and other federal agencies. The administratively determined 
positions would allow term-limited appointments of private-sector experts. 
These AD slots could allow special pay grades as appropriate and ensure a 
healthy turnover of expert staff, while the civil servant positions would 
ensure a core continuity. A small team of subject matter experts and very 
experienced federal government and private-sector employees would be 
required in the initial planning stage to avoid the usual difficulties and 
enhance CAIV’s effectiveness. 
 
 
Figure 3. CAIV Organization Chart 
                                                        
64 CAIV should take cases only when an individual is in the first or at most the second stage on the 
path to violence. Counsellors would need to be given protocols for when to engage and disengage 
in any individual case. The fusion center would allow anonymity for anyone seeking information 
but who has not decided to engage counselling services either online or in person.  
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When fully established, CAIV would undertake eight main tasks: 
(1) creating and maintaining an information fusion center; (2) establishing 
a national hotline to provide information and expert counselling services; 
(3) creating a nationwide deradicalization network; (4) acting as liaison 
with U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and military; (5) liaising with 
foreign counter-radicalization institutions; (6) publicizing and promoting 
current research; (7) providing research grants; and (8) establishing policy, 
planning, and evaluation guidelines.  
 
Create and maintain an information fusion center. The CIO would be 
responsible for maintaining a data clearinghouse, or information fusion 
center, which would be a curated database of information on violent 
ideologies. The CAIV VP for Research would be responsible for its 
research content. The fusion center would provide links to unclassified 
information produced by CAIV, other federal agencies, universities, and 
NGOs, which would be available to both domestic and international-
partner organizations. It would include empirical information on known 
recruiting efforts by members of violent ideologies inside the United 
States, as well as information about gateway ideologies and any 
organizations that are specific targets for recruitment by groups or 
individuals espousing a violent ideology. The fusion center would also 
include information for domestic consumption on how to get counseling 
and other help, either locally or from CAIV experts, for the victims of 
violent ideological recruitment.  
 
Train and provide counselors via a national hotline. The CAIV VP for 
National Hotline, Counseling, and Training would create and manage a 
national counter-radicalization hotline available to affected families, 
communities, and individuals. Because “leakage” is a critical avenue to 
identify an individual in crisis, the hotline would be key to giving families, 
teachers, and friends a resource at an early stage of a loved one’s 
radicalization, before law enforcement becomes necessary. This 
department would be also responsible for the availability of counseling 
services, both via phone and online, and would train new counselors for 
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the hotline. It would also design and provide nationally available courses 
on counseling families, individuals, and communities on relevant subjects. 
These courses would be part of the certification process for NGOs and 
others that would eventually provide counselling locally. Such training 
courses and follow-up performance audits would ensure uniformity of 
standards and procedures. The CIO would be responsible for the hotline’s 
technical needs, including designing new applications to improve its 
performance and keep current with the latest technological developments.  
 The design for the fusion center and hotline would be among the 
first tasks in the creation of CAIV, which would use best practices for 
modular design and rollout testing. Because CAIV would be subject to 
daily hacking attempts, the CIO would require support from Homeland 
Security and the private sector to ensure the highest standards for 
computer security. 
 
Create a nationwide NGO network for deradicalization. This VP would 
also be responsible for creating and certifying a national network of NGOs 
to work with local communities, families, and schools to perform counter-
radicalization interventions for recruits being targeted by a violent 
ideology. NGOs that currently operate suicide hotlines or other support 
services are likely initial candidates. Initially, these organizations would 
self-identify by applying for support grants administered by CAIV similar 
to the grants currently offered by Homeland Security, although CAIV 
grants would be focused on non-enforcement entities.  
 NGOs and government entities in the network must include 
mandatory evaluations and performance measures to create a feedback 
loop for improving performance. This does not mean treating each case 
identically; rather, it entails using standardized protocols across the 
network for communication and initial analysis of a potential case.  
 
Provide liaison with U.S. enforcement, intelligence, and military. The 
CAIV VP for Liaison, Community Outreach, & International Affairs 
would be responsible for liaison with all CAIV partners, including other 
federal government civilian agencies, the U.S. military, and individual 
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states. The liaison would include creating points of contact with Homeland 
Security’s approved enforcement fusion centers to ensure that information 
about programs, activities, lessons learned, and new threats flows laterally 
between organizations, across states, and down to all levels. 
 
Provide liaison with foreign institutions that counter radicalization. The 
CAIV VP for Liaison would also be responsible for communication with 
international programs in coordination with the State Department. Liaison 
would include both virtual and in-person meetings with international 
partners to facilitate information-sharing on potential collaboration on 
common concerns. CAIV would not maintain an overseas footprint. 
 
Promote and publicize results of research on radicalization and 
deradicalization. The CAIV VP for Research would ensure that all CAIV 
offices and network members are informed of the latest academic research 
on the radicalization process, best practices in deradicalization programs 
in prisons, and counter-radicalization interventions outside the 
enforcement process. The VP for Congressional and Public Affairs would 
offer a selection of this same information to the news media and on social 
media, and respond to the information needs of the U.S Congress.  
 The VP for Research would also recommend competitive research 
grants to universities and large NGOs to encourage and enable private-
sector research on topics related to CAIV’s mission. Because of the 
technical nature of these grants, the VP for Research would be responsible 
for developing the terms of grant offers, receiving grant applications, and 
presenting/explaining the grant applications, as described below. 
 
Provide grants to NGOs, universities, and other research centers. CAIV 
grants would support the creation and maintenance of the CAIV network 
within the United States, as well as fund research projects on topics related 
to radicalization, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization. All grants 
would require performance data. The CAIV CFO would oversee the 
grants’ financial and technical management and ensure that performance-
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reporting requirements were not burdensome, were written in plain 
English, and were sufficient for providing information to Congress.  
 The VP for the National Hotline would solicit grant applications 
from NGOs and universities to provide CAIV-certified counselling 
services at the local level. Such grants would be necessary initially, 
especially in less affluent locales. Such grants would be for a multi-year 
start-up period and the NGOs would be expected to attract private 
financing to supplement and ideally replace CAIV funding.  
 Competitive grants would be recommended by a standing 
investment committee composed of all VP and C-level executives, chaired 
by its deputy CEO. The deputy CEO would forward the investment 
committee’s recommendations to the CAIV CEO, who would make the 
final decision.  
 
Establish policy, planning, and evaluation guidelines. The department of 
the VP for Policy, Planning, and Evaluation (PP&E) would formulate 
policy recommendations for the CEO to improve CAIV’s overall 
effectiveness. This department would draft CAIV’s strategic plan, based 
on input from the rest of the corporation and the results of independent 
performance evaluation of its programs. It would also be responsible for 
reviewing performance indicators and performance measures for all 
aspects of CAIV’s work, including the fusion center, the national hotline, 
certified local NGOs, and the grant program. PP&E would work with the 
Research Office to determine what statistics should be tracked and 
analyzed and which successes or failures of domestic and international 
partners should inform CAIV’s policies and procedures. It also would help 
ensure that budget requests and allocations include performance measures.  
 
E. Inherent Difficulties, and Their Solutions 
 
 Establishing the Corporation Against Ideological Violence does 
pose some difficulties, some of which are the natural result of a 
centralized agency that must depend on decentralized execution.  
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 The first is the difficulty of maintaining high standards among 
NGOs and other network partners that provide counselling. To address the 
tendency to entropy in a large system, CAIV would need to provide 
positive leverage by creating a system of certified institutions as federally 
approved counselors. The certification would require standard training for 
counselors coupled with scheduled performance and fiscal audits to 
maintain the certification. CAIV could also certify experienced local 
institutions, especially universities, to train counselors employed by 
NGOs. Independent audits are crucial to this end. All of CAIV’s offices 
would cooperate with the Inspector General (IG) in its oversight role over 
their specific functions. However, the CFO would take the lead on 
supporting annual financial audits, and Policy, Planning and Evaluation 
would take the lead on performance audits. Training courses for network 
partners would include information about preparing for and cooperating 
with audits. Pre-audit consultations would be carried out as necessary. The 
IG would not inspect all network partners on an annual basis, but would 
audit individual grant recipients on a discretionary basis. 
 Another difficulty is the tendency for bureaucracies to multiply 
requirements and rules, which creates increased overhead costs and 
potentially slows down delivery of services. The counter to this lies in 
CAIV’s authorizing legislation. To avoid administrative bloat, legislation 
should require that general services like payroll, facilities, and the services 
of the IG be provided by the appropriate large government departments. 
For example, the Homeland Security IG could provide government audits 
for CAIV. Perhaps the most important counter to the usual bureaucratic 
difficulties will be a carefully detailed design.  
 At the international level, CAIV’s two major difficulties will be (1) 
convincing other countries that formal collaboration is in everyone’s 
interests; and (2) ensuring that its international efforts are closely 
coordinated with and mutually supportive of other federal efforts. Taken 
together, Islam’s long history, the complexities of jihadist ideology, the 
near-universal reach of social media, and the proliferation of the ISIS 
group’s and al-Qaeda’s affiliates argue that the problem of defeating 
jihadist ideology are beyond any individual country’s ability, even with 
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the United States’ significant resources globally or Saudi Arabia’s 
regionally. The issue requires the combined and coordinated efforts of all 
affected countries. In parallel with this international effort, each country 
needs to coordinate the efforts of all the appropriate government agencies 
to address the problem of modern extremist ideology based on a distorted 
version of traditional Islam. 
 The United States must recognize that it is joining a series of 
international conversations, not creating one. CAIV would work to attract 
other international programs rather than push its own program on others. 
Including information from other nations in the information fusion center 
is one way to get their attention and potentially approbation. Avoiding 
conflict with other U.S. programs will be accomplished through 
transparency, formal inter-agency agreements, and CAIV’s governance 
structure. Of course, CAIV should operate within the parameters of 
comprehensive national counterterrorism and law enforcement strategies 
and foreign policy. 
 Timing and resources are crucially linked. With sufficient 
resources, the small planning team mentioned above can create a 
strategically planned rollout, which involves identifying the timing and 
impact of each aspect of CAIV. For example, the initial task would be to 
plan the design and rollout of the fusion center in separable modules, 
followed by designs for the rollout of the help hotline, and so on. One of 
the most important tasks would be estimating the cost of creating and 





                                                        
65 Administrating funding for an end-state of approximately a 320 strong workforce would likely 
mirror MCC’s annual administrative budget without overseas operations, which is projected to be 
approximately $94 million for 2019, of which approximately $55 million accounts for human 
capital costs. 





Figure 4. Proposed CAIV Budget. Basis for costs: Congressional CR for MCC ($899 
million) in 2018, adjusted for CAIV domestic variance and lack of requirement for large 
foreign aid budget. Note: Information Technology assumes staged modular 









 Hard power alone cannot destroy jihadist ideology. When we 
finish destroying their safe haven of the moment and killing their latest 
leaders, they begin again. The United States needs a new approach to the 
deep battle, to be coordinated internationally and at home with the hard-
power tools that have been successful in the close battle. 
 The jihadists’ aim, both internationally and within the United 
States, is the radicalization of individuals and groups to accept the Jihadi 
Salafist ideology and attack the priority targets identified by a small but 
growing group of jihadist ideologues. Without recruits, their ideology has 
no impact. Destroying the ability of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other Jihadist 
groups to radicalize individuals will also destroy Jihadi Salafism by 
turning it into an historic footnote rather than the clear and present danger 
it now is.  
 Establishing the Corporation Against Ideological Violence will 
enable the United Sates to put best practices into use and attack the 
problem of violent extremist ideology in the deep battle of ideas. 






1. One model for CAIV outreach may be similar to public health 
interventions. What would a community-level intervention look 
like in your immediate community? How would it differ from the 
community you grew up in? Why? 
 
2. Given concerns about privacy and private data, what assurances 
should CAIV provide its partnership network about how 
information would be used by government agencies? 
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3. If you were helping to stand up CAIV, what would the most 
important priorities be for the first 12 months, three years, and 10 
years? What would be signs that CAIV is fulfilling its mission? 
What would be signs that CAIV needs to adjust its priorities? How 




1. What are “positive” messages for this target audience, and how 
limited or grandiose should the messaging be? What happens when 
reality does not live up to the hype? How can CAIV anticipate, 
plan for, and mitigate the effects of disillusionment?  
 
2. What are the challenges for crafting positive narratives that 
resonate with multiple different audiences?  
 
3. The Bush administration’s attempt to use advertising executives to 
craft positive audiences was ridiculed and then dismissed; why?  
 
4. How could the CAIV use its unique insights into motivations and 
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Annex A: The Recruitment Handbook 
 
 The following is a condensed interpretation of the contents of an 
al-Qaeda English language recruitment manual, which an ISIS online 
recruiter apparently used in a prolonged recruitment effort of a lonely 
young American woman in Rukmini Calimachi’s New York Times story 
“ISIS and the Lonely Young American” (June 27, 2015). Although the 
manual was originally an al-Qaeda document, it was apparently adopted 
by ISIS online recruiters. Its full title is “A Course in the Art of 
Recruiting: A graded practical program for recruiting via individual 
da‘wa.” Da‘wa, literally “Call” [to Islam], may be understood here as 
“recruiting.” 
 Before beginning to address the programmatic portion of the 
course, the author of the recruiting manual provides what he refers to as 
“important advice before starting the work.” The first point is to avoid 
criticism of the potential recruit and to be sure to thank him or her for any 
help they provide in the process, no matter how inconsequential. The flip 
side of this basic point is to welcome any of his opinions even if it opposes 
the recruiter’s views. One bit of advice appears to be especially helpful not 
only for jihadist recruiters but also for anyone trying to deprogram the 
recruit, i.e., “Don’t try to make him [the recruit] a carbon copy of yourself, 
but let him keep his independency [sic], individual character, and natural 
personality.” The author goes on to offer several corollaries to these basic 
points. The recruiter should respect the recruit’s privacy, his family, and 
even his lifestyle at least in the beginning. In short, do everything to get 
know the person you are trying to recruit, but avoid giving the impression 
that you are trying to recruit him or her. Therefore, in the beginning the 
recruiter should avoid talking about the problems of Muslims, or 
introducing the topics of al-Qaeda (or ISIS) or jihadists in general, unless 
the potential recruit introduces these topics into the conversation. The 
general idea is to avoid rushing things. Any decisions that the target 
recruit makes must always seem to be his or hers alone. To keep the 
recruitment process invisible to the target recruit, the recruiter must make 
sure that the potential recruits not be aware of others in the same process. 
Ryan Defeating ISIS and al-Qaeda on the Ideological Battlefield 
70 
 
The recruiter must be patient. The process will take months before it 
moves to the next stage. 
 
A. Target Groups for Recruiting  
 
 The manual identifies ten different categories of potential 
candidates listed from #1, “the nonreligious Muslim”, to #10, “Salafis.” 
The nonreligious Muslim is preferred because the recruiter has more 
leeway to teach them. It is also the category that has many young people 
in it, who are the safest to recruit in the author of the manual’s opinion. 
Salafis are listed last and are problematic because they have been 
thoroughly educated by scholars who generally do not approve of the 
radical jihadists like al-Qaeda and ISIS. The grouping is not strictly logical 
or according to rank except for the first (preferred) and the last 
(problematic). In category #2 are Muslims who have recently returned to 
the practice of the faith after falling away. Not all categories include 
people who are necessarily Muslims. For example, #3, “generally religious 
people” contains individuals who have the characteristics of believers but 
just need to be motivated to join an Islamic group like al-Qaeda or ISIS 
and perhaps to convert to Islam first. Category #4 includes those who have 
recently joined the Salafists, but are not content because Salafists are not 
experienced as very active and the individual is looking to be more active. 
Category #5, “the youths who live far from the cities,” does not fit into 
any religious schema because the author admits they can be religious or 
nonreligious. However, he adds that “They have a natural disposition for 
the religion and it is easy to convince them and to shape them.” Category 
#6 includes average members of Islamist groups like the Muslim 
Brotherhood and various proselytizing societies, with the caveat that the 
recruiter should pursue only the young members because older members 
tend to be “thoroughly indoctrinated.” 66  University and high school 
                                                        
66 The author of the recruitment manual recommends a subset of the Muslim Brotherhood (young 
members) who may be vulnerable to extremist recruitment, while older members are perceived as 
too set in their ways. This subset could be viewed as a potential gateway to extremism within an 
otherwise legal group, especially since the ultimate goals of the Muslim Brotherhood are generally 
congruent with more extremist groups, although their strategies on achieving those goals are 
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students make up categories #7 and #8. The universities are full of 
talented, often anti-government youth with the caveat that they are also 
“full of spies.” High school students are full of potential. The recruiter 
should strike up a relationship with those over age 15 because they still 
have open minds, and if the jihadist recruiter does not invite them to be 
religious, someone else will entice them with material goals. Category #9 
appears to be the open-ended search for prominent members of society 
who can have great impact but have “corrupted,” “non-Islamic” ideas. The 
caveat here is that the recruiter should approach only those who have open 
minds, for example, “liberals” and “secularists.” 
 The point of identifying these groups is to create a way for the 
recruiter to think about all the people he knows in these categories and 
make a first cut of those most likely to reward the time required in the 
attempt to recruit them. The manual first identifies the five characteristics 
that are disqualifiers for individuals in any group. The first is being a 
“coward,” an obvious disqualifier for a terrorist group. The second is the 
excessively talkative person. Third are those who are hostile to the 
“Mujahideen,” “These are, for example, like the Murjites, “the people who 
are soft with the tyrant leaders and harsh with the common Muslims....” 
Fourth is the stingy person. (“Money is the backbone of Jihad.”) Finally, 
the fifth killer characteristic is the loner, who “is always alone and never 
tries to make relationships with people.” (“This kind is not qualified to 
work with you so don’t waste your time.”) Obviously, the author 
understands that the true loner can be a violent killer, but he is unlikely to 
work for anyone’s goals but his own.  
 
B. The First Stage: Getting Acquainted and Choosing  
  
After a few more preparatory remarks, the author introduces the 
first stage of the course, a general assessment of potential recruitment 
targets and then choosing the ones on which to concentrate one’s efforts. 
                                                                                                                                          
circumstantial and often include the intention of abiding by the laws of a host country, especially in 
the West. It is the shared goals that argue for a group’s potential status as a gateway. In the West, 
groups on the Muslim Brotherhood model have been known to adopt other names. 
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In true al-Qaeda and ISIS bureaucratic form, the author provides a series 
of forms for the recruiter to fill out. The first one is a simple matrix of the 
names of potential targets the recruiter would have for a first cut. Against 
these names are arrayed all the pertinent facts. The recruiter is urged to 
think of all the people he knows or at least has encountered, and judge 
whether there is a potential jihadist among them. Then he or she is to fill 
in all the pertinent information about each, i.e., address, phone, job and 
any pertinent notes for each. No one the recruiter judges to have one of the 
“killer characteristics” should be on this initial list 
The next form is a matrix of all the names from the first list 
arrayed against five characteristics: Basic morals, Islamic morals, 
Distinction (family, class), Closeness (to recruiter), and Stability (family, 
job). The recruiter is then to give a rating of 1-10 points for the first four 
categories and 1-5 for the last category. For the purposes of this exercise, 
the recruiter is to revisit all the names on his list and pick two. The next 
stage in the decision process is to review the choices against three 
questions. These are arrayed against simple yes or no matrix. The first is a 
gut check. Were you convinced by your choice? If not, choose another. 
Next, did you consult anyone about your choice or pray for guidance?--a 
question that translates into “are you sure?” Finally, does your choice 
possess any of the killer “characteristics”? If the answers for this review 
indicate a problem which cannot be resolved, for example, if on reflection 
the recruiter thinks his choice actually does have one or more of the killer 
characteristics, the recruiter must return to his list and make another 
choice. 
 
C. The Second Stage: Getting Close (or Approaching)  
 
 After finishing the first stage of recruitment with choices made, the 
manual guides the reader into the second stage “Getting close (or 
approaching).” This stage proceeds in the same painstaking fashion as the 
first stage. The al-Qaeda document, revised in 2010, assumes that the 
recruiter will be surrounded by acquaintances and his relationship will 
likely be in person. Jihadist recruiters today are likely be acquaintances on 
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social media, and the recruiter is likely to be in another country from his 
or her target. In this stage, the recruiter will never mention jihad or his real 
purpose. He or she will strive to strike up a friendship based on a religious 
interest in Islam on the part of the target. The recruiter will strive to 
become a helpful Muslim friend with long conversations and interventions 
on a daily and weekly basis. The recruiter will send appropriate presents, 
electronically or through ordinary mail of a religious nature or even candy. 
To an experienced eye, the relationship may well appear to be grooming, 
but to the target, the recruiter will appear to be a reliable friend who is 
always available, always helpful, and never argumentative or judgmental. 
The relationship will continue slowly over weeks or more likely months 
with the target becoming increasingly dependent on the recruiter. 
 As in the previous stage, the course provides the recruiter with 
forms to fill out to keep a record of daily and weekly activities. The 
recruiter must know about the target’s “concerns, interests, and 
relationships with other people and how he spends his complete 24 hours 
in a day.” The recruiter must have taken note of the target’s negative and 
positive characteristics and “make a long term plan to remedy” his or her 
negative ones. When the recruiter has compiled enough information and 
executed the plan laid out in great detail in the manual, the recruiter must 
do an assessment of progress. Again the course presents a form, this time 
with eight questions arrayed against a numerical rating: 1 for “No,” 2 for 
“Sometimes,” and 3 for “yes.” The questions are all aimed at achieving the 
goal of getting close to the target such as “Does he talk to you about his 
private affairs and his hobbies?” and “Does he love to spend a lot of time 
with you?” A score of less than 10 would mean that the target has received 
a no on all or most questions. Obviously, the target could receive a no on 
seven questions and only one “yes” and still score a 10. A score of less 
than 10 means that the process has failed and the recruiter should choose 
another target and start the process over. If the target receives a score from 
“10 to 18” the recruiter can be satisfied of some success but must continue 
the process for another month and repeat the assessment of the target. 
Finally, with a score from 19 to 24, the author of the manual proclaims, 
“your choice was a good one, continue with the Blessing of Allah, but you 
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should know that your close relationship with him (the recruit) must 
continue.” 
 The recruiter, however, may not continue to the third stage of the 
course until he or she completes a security survey. Again the course 
presents a form with three questions arrayed against “executed” and “not 
executed” The course cannot continue unless the response to all three 
questions is “executed,” “or there will be a danger for you.” The questions 
are intended to reveal how much the recruiter knows about his recruit and 
in what detail. “Did you find out how he [recruit] spends most of his 
time?” “Did you find out about most of his relationships and who he 
associates with?” The final question is perhaps the most ominous for the 
future relationship: “Did you find out his characteristics which will soften 
him up (and give you access to his heart), and did you find out his 
weaknesses?” To clarify the importance of this last question, the author 
provides a final form to record the positive and negative characteristics “to 
benefit from them.” 
 
D. Third Stage: The Awakening of Faith  
 
 At this point the recruiter, hiding his or her ultimate intention, 
becomes a friend and mentor in faith. This means working through the 
ritual practices and articles of faith in Sunni Islam. This approach is still 
far from introducing the jihadist path as interpreted specifically by al-
Qaeda, ISIS, or any specific jihadist group. However, the course 
introduces ten topics to be covered, which the recruiter can rely on when 
the time comes for the actual invitation to the recruit to join a group. In 
this stage, the recruiter will teach by example as much as by word. So, the 
first assessment following the methods employed in the earlier stages is to 
determine whether the recruiter is ready or even eager “to practice what 
you preach.” If the recruiter is not minimally ready to set a perfect 
example as measured by the assessment, the author directs the would-be 
recruiter to turn the target recruit over to “a righteous friend” who can 
continue the program. On the other hand, if the recruiter passes the 
assessment with a minimal grade, he may continue but should strive to 
Ryan Defeating ISIS and al-Qaeda on the Ideological Battlefield 
75 
 
improve his personal score as he becomes the mentor for the target recruit. 
If the recruiter scores high in the personal assessment, he is urged to 
“strive your utmost because this stage never ends.” The author of the 
course is mostly encouraging. He notes, “If the people only accept advice 
from completely righteous advisors, then we will not find any advisors 
who are qualified to give advice.”  
 The ten topics should not be surprising to anyone familiar with 
Salafist Islam and most of them would be familiar, to some extent, to any 
student of Sunni Islam. These include faith in and love for Allah; yearning 
for Paradise and fear of Hell; love and respect for the Messenger of Allah 
Muhammad; observing all the obligatory prayer times; avoiding all forms 
of sin; practicing truthfulness and sincerity; increasing non-obligatory 
good deeds and prayer; and generally adopting a “beautifully decorated” 
character without bad morals or manners. 
 Two of the topics are closer to the whole purpose of the 
recruitment than the rest. The first of these describes the “virtues of jihad 
and martyrdom.” The approach is intended to be subtle. This is not the 
jihad of al-Qaeda or ISIS. The emphasis is on the role of traditional jihad 
within Islam and the justification of jihad through the hadiths. There are 
plenty of examples that the recruiter can use from the earliest days of 
Islam. The idea behind the topic is to lead the target recruit to see that 
jihad and dying a hero of jihad, a martyr, saves the good Muslim from the 
fires of hell. The stories or examples from history can be tailored to the 
personality of the recruit. The second topic, “Trials and Patience,” is a 
more dangerous area for the recruiter. The recruiter needs to provide his 
subject with information about the trials and tribulations of the jihad 
without frightening him or her away. At the same time, the recruiter must 
give his target recruit enough to think about so that he or she will not be 
“shocked by the truth,” when that is revealed in the final stage of the 
course. This is a topic for which the recruiter’s knowledge of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the target recruit will help with shaping the message so 
that it will appeal to its audience of one. 
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i. Shrinking the World  
 
 The rest of this stage of the course will be consumed with practical 
and theoretical lessons to deepen the target’s faith and radicalize him or 
her so that the world will shrink to a dependency on this new Muslim 
friend or friends. It is a stage of shared prayers, lessons, and more gifts. 
The recruiter is a mentor and exemplar of the good Muslim to the recruit. 
If the recruit is a non-Muslim, he or she will be encouraged to convert at 
this time. If the recruit is a lukewarm Muslim, he or she will be 
encouraged to deepen a commitment to Islam. The recruit will become, in 
the words of the author of the course, “a stranger, but not alone.” By this 
he means that the recruit will be a stranger to all the world except his new, 
loving friends. His or her world will be warm with prayer, acts of kindness 
(given and received), presents, shared meals, shared prayers, and works of 
charity. This sharing may be via the internet or in person. His or her world 
will be shrunk to one path forward. This can be a very powerful appeal to 
the adolescent or young adult who is the preferred target of the course. It 
may be very difficult to recover the target recruit at this point. This 
process is sometimes referred to as “de-pluralization.” The target’s world 
is shrunk to a single path forward, even though they may be unaware in 
their initial enthusiasm. 
 The recruiter is encouraged to use his or her imagination and to 
vary the times and the methods of training according to circumstance. The 
course suggests supplying the target with commonly available pamphlets 
on Islamic topics, books emphasizing the virtues of jihad in Islamic 
history, and the Qur’an in translation. Appropriate videos and lectures by 
well-known Muslim preachers are introduced at this point. To fill up the 
recruit’s time, the recruiter should get his or her commitment to a prepared 
schedule for prayer times. The candidate is encouraged to perform self-
assessments for at least one month. The recruiter is required to do yet 
another self-evaluation to maximize the variety of practical teaching 
methods used at this stage. The recruiter should not introduce doubts at 
this stage or discourage the recruit in any way. If the recruit raises 
questions or doubts, answer his doubts simply using the Qur’an, hadith, 
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and examples from the time of the Rashidun Caliphs, etc. As with all other 
stages, the course provides a self-assessment for the recruiter and an 
assessment of the recruit to determine whether he or she is ready to move 
to the next stage. 
 
E. Fourth Stage: Planting the Concepts  
 
 During this stage, the recruiter plunges deeper into the theory and 
reality of jihad by introducing the basic concepts of jihadist ideology “to 
indoctrinate” the candidate. The course suggests spending at least two 
months at a minimum on this stage. The jihadist concepts are revealed 
clearly for the first time. The first concept is holding fast to the Qur’an and 
Sunna, which is true for any Sunni Muslim. However, this is explained in 
a novel sense: “if anyone of the Mujahideen makes a mistake in the basic 
principles of the deen [i.e. Islam], the candidate must disassociate himself 
from such a wrong-doing without hesitation.” This is a variation of the 
Wahhabi principle of “Allegiance and Disavowal,” i.e., allegiance to 
Muslims, jihadists in this case, and disavowal of everyone else. A key 
concept is that jihad and preparing for it are religious obligations. Also, if 
a ruler governs by any law other than the Qur’an and Sunna, he is a 
disbeliever, i.e., what is known as “Al Hakimiyyah” [sovereignty belongs 
to Allah alone]. Islam as presented does not allow democracy. 
 Under the heading of general concepts, the candidate is introduced 
to jihadist religious scholars and encouraged to be familiar with them. The 
course also explains how the jihadist movement is under attack all over the 
world, and this includes the media and government attacks on jihadist 
scholars. The candidate should understand, however, that jihadists are all 
over the world, so he need never feel lonely. If the candidate cannot join a 
jihadist group (the best way), the course introduces a number of ways he 
can participate in jihad without joining a group. For example, the 
candidate can become one of the Mujahideen on the Internet. He can view 
and share jihadist videos, join jihadist forums, etc. The first sign that the 
candidate is ready to move to the next stage is that he or she requests jihad 
and wants jihad. The second sign is that he or she reads jihadist books and 
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requests knowledge of Islamic legislation. The author warns that the 
second sign has a dangerous side to it because there are untrustworthy 
legal opinions and problematic Muslim scholars. The idea is to delay 
delving into this issue until the final stage. As with previous stages, the 
course provides an assessment of the candidate’s performance to 
determine whether he is ready to move to the last stage. 
 
F. The Last Stage: The Establishment of the Brigade  
 
 The author states that he “will not speak a lot in this stage.” He 
claims that everything the recruiter “must know” and “will want to know” 
is contained in Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance. 
The author intends for the course to be “a stepping stone” to al-Suri’s 
book, which is the compilation of his insights and recommendations based 
on his long experience of and research into jihad. This appears to be 
strange advice for the reader of the English translation of the course, 
which must have been originally written in Arabic. Al-Suri’s book, 
completed in late 2004, is a dense Arabic composition of 1604 pages in its 
PDF form. Having this book in one’s possession is a likely cause for arrest 
in most Arabic speaking countries. It is a fugitive book on most jihadist 
websites and only parts of it in English translation are readily available.67 
The inclusion of this reference is likely the translator’s concern about 
being faithful to the original author’s text, which is characteristic of 
insider translations of jihadist documents. Al-Suri is known for his 
theories of individual and small-cell terrorism behind enemy lines with a 
special emphasis on the United States and its allies. 
 In this final stage, the author provides some approaches to jihad in 
a practical sense. The recruiter should now “paint the scene” of this stage 
as one that demands activity and preparation. The recruiter should open 
                                                        
67 For a detailed biography of al-Suri along with selected translations of his book see Brynjar Lia, 
Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008); see also Jim Lacey, ed., A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad: 
Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2008); for a brief analysis of his strategy and selected translations, see also Ryan, Decoding al-
Qaeda’s Strategy (2013), 193-254. 
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the topic of jihad either in the recruiter’s country or some other country. 
The recruiter should not expect that his target, who has now become his 
charge, has any idea about how to go about it or prepare for it. The first 
way to solve this problem is to present him with books that feature the 
sufferings of jihadists at the hands of various countries. The idea is not to 
make this a “source of fear,” but instead to make the stories of Muslims 
who have been tortured and killed a source of anger. The recruiter should 
actively engage his charge in making preparations after reviewing options. 
Once again the course brings up al-Suri’s book as a source of inspiration 
and practical advice. The recruiter needs to bring up examples of 
successful jihadists, some of whom his charge may not know about in any 
sense. Finally, the recruiter is encouraged to read al-Suri’s book and if that 
is not possible at least recommended sections about recruiting, 
methodology, and the “Way.” Depending on the recruiter’s situation and 
his charge’s strengths, the recruiter may suggest a group, the “brigade” in 
the title of this stage, which his charge may want to join. If this is not 
feasible, then the two may discuss the rationale, legal justification and 
methodology of performing jihad “individually.” One gets the impression 
that the author cannot be more specific without knowing the particulars of 
an audience he does not know. The author does not suggest the obvious 
approach of seeking the advice of other colleagues that the recruit may or 
may not have already met either online or in person. 
 In the final mobilization stage, the recruiter encourages the recruit 
to join a jihadist group. For an ISIS or al-Qaeda recruiter, the recruit will 
be urged to pledge allegiance to the leadership of one of these groups. The 
specific action the recruiter recommends at this point will depend on the 
nature of the recruit and the needs of the jihadist group at the time. The 
action may be to stay in place, in which case the recruit will be expected to 
become self-sustaining and perhaps become a recruiter of others in his or 
her family or from among the recruit’s friends. The recruiter may provide 
the recruit a one-time infusion of funds to provide for an easy start-up. If 
the recruit needs to travel to a “hot jihad” the recruiter could offer the 
recruit a round trip ticket to some European destination, (as in the case of 
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Alex in Rukmini Calimachi’s New York Times story) where a handler 
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Annex B: The Millennium Challenge Corporation 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is an innovative 
presidential initiative established in 2004 by President George W. Bush. 
MCC’s purpose is to help economically poor countries by entering multi-
year agreements, referred to as “compacts” to fund economically 
beneficial and sustainable projects. The projects that form the basis of the 
compacts’ funding requests are proposed and executed by the countries 
themselves without a large MCC presence in country. To be eligible for a 
compact, countries must pass a series of threshold indicators 
recommended by outside institutions (e.g. The World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, etc.). The 
indicators offer objective measures demonstrating that a country can use 
the funding efficiently and appropriately. (For details see 
(https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/indicators) These indicators include 
such items as ways to start a business and control of corruption. Because 
very poor countries often cannot meet the requirements of these indicators, 
MCC offers “threshold funding” to help improve selected countries’ 
scores. Meeting these threshold requirements often entails improvements 
in a country’s financial bureaucracy and business climate, control of 
corruption, and trade policy, but can include such items as human rights 
and the rule of law. At the compact stage, an investment board composed 
of VP level executive and chaired by the Deputy CEO makes 
recommendations for funding to the CEO for decision. 
According to the MCC website (https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-
work) oversees 47 country programs with a highly skilled workforce 
projected to be 320 employees by 2019. Congressional oversight 
requirements include an annual performance report that documents 
country program performance data on “specific objectives and 
benchmarks for measuring progress.” MCC also must report to Congress 
on the cost effectiveness of its programs and maintain a rigorous 
evaluation program. The cost of this effort in in the 2018 Congressional 
Continuing Resolution (CR) is projected to be approximately $899 
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million. The bulk of this funding ($795 million) is for economic assistance 
to foreign countries. Administrative costs covering salaries, IT, overseas 
operations, etc. consume approximately $104 million. MCC administrative 
costs have remained relatively flat over the most recent 6 years. (Source 
for budget figures: (https://www.mcc.gov/resources/story/story-cbj-
fy2019-admin-expenses) 
 
The MCC Organization 
The MCC workforce is distributed among six departments: The 
Office of the CEO, the General Counsel, the VP for Administration and 
Finance, the VP for Compact Operations, the VP for Congressional and 
Public Affairs, and the VP for Policy & Evaluation. Workforce salaries for 
320 employees is projected to be approximately $55 million. 
 
Board of Directors 
 The MCC Board of Directors is comprised of the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, the 
Administrator of USAID, the CEO of MCC and four private sector 
members appointed by the President of the United States. 
 
The MCC Advisory Council 
The MCC Advisory Council provides private sector expertise, 
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